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DESPITE HIS ANTICS, T.O. HAS A VALID POINT: WHY NFL
PLAYERS DESERVE A BIGGER PIECE OF THE PIE
I. INTRODUCTION
By now the image is familiar: the old, out-of-shape so-called
sports analyst ("purist") criticizing the modern professional athlete
for turning sports into business.1 Over the past twenty years, as sala-
ries sky-rocketed in the wake of free agency, the press has scorched
players for their greediness, disloyalty, and backward sense of per-
ception. 2 Purists, however, do not realize that professional sports
have always been businesses to team owners and league officials.
3
National Football League ("NFL") players, on the other hand, came
1. See, e.g., CNN Saturday Morning (CNN television broadcast Dec. 31, 2005)
("With numbers like that, the cries of football purists become the sounds of si-
lence." (quoting CNN sports business analyst in reference to financial success of
2003 Tostitos Fiesta Bowl)).
2. See, e.g., Justin Cohn, Cancellation Proves Even Good Guys Get Greedy, J. - GA-
ZETTE (Fort Wayne), Feb. 17, 2005, at 1B (criticizing "the world of modern profes-
sional athletics, where all too many of the headlines are dominated by arrogance,
selfishness, criminality and, most of all, greed"); Bill Conlin, Now, They're Royalty:
Saberhagen Shuts Door on Cardinals in Game 7 Romp, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 28,
1985, at 104 (" [A] rrogance, greed and self-serving peevishness is woven deeply into
the fabric of the game."); Mark Gee, Mailbag: Hooray for Standing Up to McCardell,
Greed, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 24, 2004, at 5 (opining National Football League ("NFL")
wide receiver Keenen McCardell's challenge against owners' greed is rare); Wil-
liam Gildea, 80s, 90s: The Way It Was, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 31, 1989, at Cl ("Sports
in the 1980s brought a grief and greed that nothing in our experience had pre-
pared us for.").
3. See MICHAEL MACCAMBRIDGE, AMERICA'S GAME: THE EPIc STORY OF How PRO
FOOTBALL CAPTURED A NATION 316 (Random House 2004) (indicating that after
nearly losing their franchises during World War II, NFL owners were reluctant to
share their newly found wealth with players); STEFAN SZYMANsKi & ANDREW ZIMBAL-
IST, NATIONAL PASTIME: How AMERICANS PLAY BASEBALL AND THE REST OF THE
WORL PLAYS SOCCER 20-21 (Brookings Institution Press 2005) (explaining exis-
tence of baseball business as early as 1860s); Scott E. Backman, NFL Players Fight for
Their Freedom: The History of Free Agency in the NFL, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 2 (2002)
("From the outset, owners and players operated under a typical employer/em-
ployee relationship in which the owners set the rules, salaries, and working condi-
tions . . ."); David J. Sipusic, Comment, Instant Repay: Upon Further Review, the
National Football League's Misguided Approach to the Signing Bonus Should be Over-
turned, 8 SPORTS LAW. J. 207, 210 (2001) (explaining owners first treated profes-
sional football as organized business in 1920); Murray Chass, Murray Chass on
Baseball: Insiders Recall Birth of Free Agency 10 Years Ago, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1985, at
S3 ("[Management] held all the guns, and they basically could do whatever they
wanted to do, including infringing on your personal life to get their way." (quoting
player who won arbitration case which officially began free agency in Major
League Baseball ("MLB")). Owners, like the sports themselves, evolved over time:
In the early years of every professional sport, the owners were men of
great dedication and expertise ....
(425)
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late to the party and are only recently beginning to understand
their rights to a bigger piece of an enormous pie.4
Now we have the "T.O. Situation" - Philadelphians' coin-name
for Terrell Owens's 5 ("T.O.") threatened holdout and the accompa-
Their type was soon superseded, however, by the business tycoon
who made his fortune in trade, then dabbled in sports ownership both as
a means of advertising his product and finding community approval ....
Then came the third echelon of owner, the corporate manager who
bought a club not only to publicize his business enterprises but also to
take advantage of... federal tax laws.
JAMES A. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 357 (Random House 1976) (recounting
how owners came to treat sports franchises as parts of their overall business
portfolios).
4. See Bill Saporito, The Money Machine: Sure, It's Got Fat TV Contracts. But
There's Far More to the NFL's Success Than the Nation's Passion for Football, TIME, Jan.
2005, at A7 (arguing NFL, more so than other sports, capitalized on sports indus-
try's rising value during 1990s); Aron Kahn, Vikings Rank Last Among NFL's Incredi-
bly Rich, PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.twincities.com/mld/twincities/
2005/09/02/sports/12538358.htm (explaining how Minnesota Vikings dropped
to poorest NFL franchise over past year yet still increased its worth by more than $54
million). As of 2004, the average NFL franchise was worth $531 million and in
2003 the NFL saw $5 billion in revenues, up over 500% since 1989. See Saporito,
supra, at A8-10 (adding that NFL's twenty new or renovated stadiums in past ten
years are League's fastest growing revenue source); Michael K. Ozanian, Football
Fiefdoms, Sept. 3, 2004, http://www.forbes.com/business/2004/09/02/
cz kb_0902nflintro.html (asserting average 2004 NFL franchise was worth $733
million and had operating income (earnings before depreciation, taxes, interest,
and amortization) of $851 million). In addition, the NFL's new television deal
beginning in 2006 will pay the league $3.7 billion annually, a 53% increase from its
current contract. See Kurt Badenhausen et al., The Business of Football, Sept. 1, 2005,
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2005/09/01 /sports-football-gambling-cz_05nfland.
html (detailing NFL's new television contract); Andy Bernstein, Exit Interview: Sha-
piro on Sports, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J., Oct. 3-9, 2005, at 1, 34 ("To the
NFL's credit, they had a lot of buyers [for its most recent television deals]. And
they got somebody that was willing to pay [the] money [that ABC offered] and
more." (quoting ESPN's former vice-president of programming and production,
Mark Shapiro)). Further, since the summer of 2005 alone, the NFL has made
many substantial endorsement deals. See, e.g., Daniel Kaplan & Terry Lefton, Mol-
son Coors Renewing with NFL, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J., Sept. 5-11, 2005, at 1
(noting NFL's five-year sponsorship deal with Molson Coors worth $500 million);
Terry Lefton & Daniel Kaplan, Sprint, NFL near $200M Dea4 STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTS Bus. J., June 20-26, 2005, at 1 (describing deal's potential worth of $600
million over five years); Terry Lefton, Samsung Fills Open Category for the NFL,
STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J., Oct. 3-9, 2005, at 1 (reporting NFL's deal with
Samsung was "well into eight figures per year").
5. See Terrell Owens, http://www.sportsline.com/nfl/players/playerpage/
1290 (last visited Mar. 15, 2006) (giving brief summary of Terrell Owens's ("T.O.")
career and indicating that he is wide receiver for Philadelphia Eagles). The Eagles
signed T.O. prior to the 2004 NFL season. See id. At that time, he left the San
Francisco 49ers after well-documented, prolonged disputes with the team's
quarterback and coach. See Feuding 49ers Patch Things Up Enough to Trip Lions,
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Mich.), Oct. 6, 2003, at D7 (describing once-ongoing feud
between T.O. and then-49ers head coach Steve Mariucci); Kevin Lynch, Owens
Vents, Return Looks Very Unlikely, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 24, 2004, at C5 ("I'm willing to
work out a contract if the Niners can get a quarterback to match my skills as a
[Vol. 13: p. 425
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nying media frenzy that began shortly after T.O.'s heroic effort in
Super Bowl XXXIX. 6 T.O. is the poster-child for the purists' gripe.
Under his current seven-year contract, he is slated to make $49 mil-
lion; yet he recently quipped amid tears that his family's financial
welfare was somehow in jeopardy.7 T.O. followed suit throughout
the summer and fall of 2005 by creating locker-room problems and
appearing on national media outlets.8 His all-out media blitz took
receiver! . . . A receiver is only as good as his quarterback." (ellipsis in original)
(quoting T.O.)).
6. See, e.g., Les Bowen, Birds Try to Make Sense of T.O. Situation, PHILA. DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 10, 2005, at E98 (summarizing whirlwind of events leading to T.O.'s
four-game suspension and deactivation for remainder of 2005 season). For a
description of NFL contract holdouts, see infra notes 60-66 and accompanying
text.
7. See Michael Bradley, Business Weak: Owens' Approach to Renegotiating is All
Wrong, Apr. 14, 2005, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2005/writers/
michaelbradley/04/14/el.hombre/index.html (noting T.O.'s seven-year con-
tract); David Whitley, T.O. Could Learn A Lot From High School Athletes, CENTRE DAILY
TIMES (State College, PA), Apr. 19, 2005, at B6 ("No matter what anybody else says
about me, my family comes first." (quoting MSNBC interview with T.O.)). This
quote sparked an immediate, prolonged attack on T.O. by the media and the pub-
lic. See, e.g., Shelly Anderson, Hey, Hines Thanks for Being All Business, PITrSBURGH
POST GAZETTE, Sept. 9, 2005, at D2 ("'I have to take care of my family.' That's the
load of horse hair Terrell Owens and others have been dishing up when they de-
cide that $1 million a year or $5 million or $10 million isn't enough and begin
barking for more."); Mike Gross, Show T.O. the Money? Not Likely, SUNDAY NEWS
(Lancaster, PA), Apr. 24, 2005, at 1 (recounting how Philadelphia radio talk show
offered to help T.O.'s family by starting food drive); T.O. and I Have Lots in Com-
mon, BucKs COUNTY COURIER TIMES, Aug. 19, 2005, at 2D (stating sarcastically: "So
Terrell, I understand completely where you are coming from. Keep ignoring the
hypocrite and the portly head coach. Remember that you have to feed that family
of yours."). For a discussion of how signing bonuses artificially inflate NFL salaries
and how T.O. is most likely to see only a fraction of his $49 million contract, see
infra notes 152-70 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how the NFL should
more handsomely compensate its players, see infra notes 211-16 and accompanying
text.
8. See Whitley, supra note 7 (noting T.O. publicly questioned Eagles'
quarterback Donavan McNabb's effort during Super Bowl). Further, the Eagles
suspended T.O. for a week after a heated argument with Eagles' head coach Andy
Reid only a few days into training camp. See Paul Domowitch, Reese: T.O. Feud a
Passing Situation, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 30, 2005, at 72 (describing T.O.'s return
after his suspension during early August 2005). Soon after this suspension, T.O.,
with agent Drew Rosenhaus by his side, spoke to a national audience on ESPN's
heavily watched television show Pardon The Interruption. See id. ("[T.O.] warned the
Eagles that kicking him out of training camp for a week wasn't going to make him
any easier to live with."). In this same television appearance, T.O. stated he was no
longer speaking with his quarterback. See Bob Brookover, T.O. is Talking Silent
Treatment: He Says He Doesn't Want to Speak to McNabb, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 12,
2005, at DI ("My attitude is not going to change .... I have no desire to talk to
[Eagles quarterback] Donovan [McNabb]." (quoting T.O.)). Later, T.O. ap-
peared on The Late Show with David Letterman on Oct. 4, 2005. See Shannon Ryan,
T.O. Gets Laughs with Letterman, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 5, 2005, at D6 ("Donovan
and I . . . we've come to grips with all the things that have happened during the
course of the off-season and during training camp .... " (quoting T.O.)).
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full form on April 14, 2005, when T.O.'s agent Drew Rosenhaus
argued T.O.'s case on Dan Patrick's national ESPN radio show:
This was not a normal negotiation [referring to Owens's
contract settlement with the Eagles] .... He had to take a
substandard deal because he had no leverage... It sounds
great on paper, but in the first two years of the deal he is
not even in the top 10 highest-paid receivers in the NFL
... He absolutely outperformed his deal. I've had many
players that have been cut when they underperformed de-
spite having just done a multiyear deal the year before,
like Hugh Douglas with the Jaguars. Why can't we say that
he outperformed this deal, which was done under poor
circumstances? 9
With this statement, Rosenhaus soundly conveyed his player's
message and launched a national debate.10 While many discarded
their appeal as vacuous, partly because of T.O. and Rosenhaus's
crassness, the dynamic duo has a valid point: NFL contracts, like
9. Owens Technicality Gave Wide Receiver Negotiating Power, PITrSBURGH POST GA-
ZETTE, Apr. 17, 2005, at ClI (ellipsis in original) (quoting Drew Rosenhaus from
his interview with Dan Patrick on ESPN Radio). More recently, Rosenhaus ap-
peared on such shows as ESPN2's Quite Frankly and CBS's The Late Show With David
Letterman. SeeJohn Molori, Rotten Rosenhaus, Going Hollywood, Bet You Didn't Know
.Aug. 15, 2005, http://www.bostonsportsmedia.com/archives/blitz/003075.
php ("Drew Rosenhaus... has become a media magnet, appearing on any show
that can tolerate his braggadocio .. ").
10. See, e.g., Bob Brookover, Scoring Well: Next to His Rivals' Deals, T.O.'s Con-
tract Doesn't Look Bad, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 16, 2005, at DI [hereinafter
Brookover, Rivals] ("Unless you've been abducted by aliens .... you've heard that
Terrell Owens isn't happy with the seven-year contract he signed with the Eagles
before [the 2005] season."). For a further discussion of the public's reaction to
T.O.'s televised appeal for a new contract, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
For a further discussion detailing Rosenhaus's attempts to publicize T.O.'s plot,
see supra note 9 and accompanying text. Rosenhaus, known as the toughest NFL
agent for his relentless contract negotiation tactics, represents over ninety of the
NFL's elite players, including: Javon Walker, Edgerrin James, Chad Johnson, Clin-
ton Portis, Hugh Douglas, Willis McGahee, and Jeremy Shockey. See Dave
Scheiber, Feeding Frenzy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 1C (describing
Rosenhaus as "sleepless shark" and listing many other players he represents). He
is infamous for using the media to increase his and his players' salaries. See id.
(characterizing Rosenhaus as savvy publicist); see also SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra
note 3, at 146 (explaining how media exposure is critical part of sports because
people like "watching the money"). Recently, Rosenhaus's publicity tactics
backfired when Pro-Bowl wide receiverJavon Walker fired Rosenhaus. See Liz Mul-
len, Walker's New Agent to Talk to Pack, Not Press, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J.,
Dec. 19-25, 2005, at 16 (citing Rosenhaus's media stunts as cause for his firing).
[Vol. 13: p. 425
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those in Major League Baseball ("MLB"), should have more guar-
anteed money."1
This Comment, drawing primarily on comparisons to MLB, ex-
plores why NFL teams do not guarantee contracts and argues that
they should. Section II develops and compares the histories of the
NFL, MLB, and the concurrent labor movement.1 2 It also explains
the effects of MLB's antitrust exemption and describes the NFL's
current holdout situation. Section III sorts through the supporting
case law, asserts the NFL Players Association ("NFLPA") 13 needed
the courts to achieve its goals, looks at the NFL's and MLB's collec-
tive bargaining agreements ("CBA"), and details why NFL salaries
are typically smaller than MLB salaries. 14 Finally, Section IV sets
forth a different perspective of U.S. professional sports leagues with
a comparison to soccer's global stage, revisits the "T.O. Situation,"
and considers the possible impact of implementing T.O. and
Rosenhaus's proposal.1 5
II. RELEVANT NFL & MLB HISTORY
According to Neil D. Harris, University of Maryland English
professor and sports historian, "[S]alaries in professional sports
11. See, e.g., MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 317 (explaining how NFL players
began seeking more guaranteed money during their first strike in 1974); see also
Lawrence M. Kahn, The Effects of Race on Professional Football Players' Compensation, 45
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 295, 299 (1992) [hereinafter Kahn, Effects] ("Unlike long-
term baseball player contracts, . . .multi-year football player contracts are almost
never guaranteed." (citations omitted)); Sipusic, supra note 3, at 219 (noting NFL
franchises guaranteed only twelve percent of teams' total payrolls in 1989 and
forty-eight percent in 1999). For further evidence of the media's attack on T.O.,
see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion outlining the relevant background material on the NFL's
and MLB's business operations, see infra notes 16-70 and accompanying text.
13. Despite players' efforts to unionize as early as 1956, the NFLPA became an
official union in 1968 when the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") recog-
nized it as an official labor organization. See Backman, supra note 3, at 11 (summa-
rizing NFLPA's history); Sipusic, supra note 3, at 216 (noting 1956 discussions
eventually led to NFLPA's formation). According to John Mackey, former NFL
player and first president of the combined NFL and AFL Players Associations, this
1970 merger marked the beginning of the modem NFLPA. SeeJOHN MACKEY &
THOM LovERRo, BLAZING TRALxs: COMING OF AGE IN FOOTBALL'S GOLDEN ERA 186
(Triumph Books 2003) (adding that NLRB recognition empowered NFLPA "to
force the owners to the bargaining table"). For a description of the case John
Mackey brought against the NFL, see infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion summarizing the NFLPA's inability to capitalize
on court decisions and the lack of guaranteed contracts in the NFL, see infra notes
71-206 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion concluding that guaranteeing contracts would not signifi-
cantly hinder the NFL's financial success, see infra notes 207-21. For a description
of the "T.O. Situation," see supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
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[are] just a reflection of what is going on in society."1 6 Therefore,
understanding the histories of the NFL, MLB, and the United
States labor movement is critical to comprehending current player
salaries and the NFL's financial success. In addition, an examina-
tion of MLB's antitrust exemption and both the NFL's and MLB's
CBAs is necessary to understand how and why NFL teams refuse to
grant guaranteed contracts. 17
A. NFL History
The NFL is the richest and most popular sports league in the
United States.' 8 Its exponential growth occurred during the late
1950s and early 1960s, a time when "[b]aseball towered above the
sporting landscape like a colossus... [as] the only game that mat-
tered."19 Football's television success began in 1958 and was crucial
to the NFL's development. 20 But NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle's
"perfect, egalitarian vision" of the NFL brought the game to unpar-
alleled heights. 2 1
16. Gildea, supra note 2 (quoting Professor Harris, who argues sports cannot
be separated from rest of society).
17. For a further discussion of MLB's antitrust exemption, see infra notes 34-
37 and accompanying text. For a comparison of the NFL's and MLB's CBA, see
infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Clay Latimer, American Evolution: The NFL Has Become 'America's
Game,'A Title It Is Not About to Give Up, RocKy MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 8, 2005, at
10C ("The NFL seems to have it all these days: $1 billion franchises, $100 million
players, $10 billion in TV contracts, its own satellite/cable-TV network, [and] a 2-
to-1 edge over baseball in public popularity.").
19. MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 3, at xiv, xv (noting by 1972, thirty-six percent
of Americans considered football their favorite sport while twenty-one percent con-
sidered baseball their favorite).
20. See id. at ix-xiv (describing how epic 1958 NFL championship game be-
tween Baltimore Colts and New York Giants played at Yankee Stadium and broad-
cast nationally on NBC jump-started NFL's successful partnership with television
media outlets).
21. See id. at xv (acknowledging that though NFL surgically exploited televi-
sion, "the medium alone cannot explain the rise of the message."). Rozelle's influ-
ence, beginning in the early 1960s, was widespread:
Rozelle understood that leagues were most likely to succeed financially
when they lived up to the ideals of a higher cause - fair play.
His mastery in tailoring the NFL's image for a broad middle-class audi-
ence helped make the game more appealing .... Rozelle sold sports as
they'd never been sold before - as a sophisticated passion, rather than a
trivial juvenile pastime.
The self-evident truth that Rozelle stressed repeatedly was that the busi-
ness of sports would be most successful if the competition was as equita-
ble as possible. So the business model that emerged through the '50s,
'60s, and '70s viewed the league's teams not as a number of restaurants
[Vol. 13: p. 425
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The American Football League ("AFL") was equally important
to the NFL's development because it combined Rozelle's vision
with AFL-founder Lamar Hunt's vision "of widespread and wide-
open opportunity. " 22 Motivated by the NFL's refusal to expand,
Hunt formed the AFL in 1959.23 Interestingly, antitrust laws were
simultaneously crucial to the NFL's success and the source of its
nearly failed merger with the AFL. 24 The AFL, formed in the wake
of the Supreme Court's decision in Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc. 25 and with "[a]ntitrust questions from Congress [having] been
muted . . . " proved critical to the NFL's success because the com-
petition between the two leagues inherently manufactured a better
combined product. 26 Meanwhile, the U.S. House Judiciary Com-
mittee balked at approving the AFL-NFL merger because it violated
antitrust laws.27
vying for supremacy on a single street, but instead a chain of restaurants
... each dependent on the survival of the whole to truly prosper.
Id. at xv-xvi (explaining NFL's decision in 1961 to equally share television revenues
would prove critical once television became NFL's largest source of revenue). For
a further discussion of the NFL's current television contracts, see supra note 4. For
a further discussion of MLB's television contracts, see infra notes 38-40 and accom-
panying text.
22. MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 3, at xvii ("[T]he feuding leagues unwittingly
accelerated the growth of the sport as a whole."). For details on how the AFL and
NFL secretly implemented their merger, see id. at 216-30.
23. See id. at 120-24 (noting NFL tried to use news of new league to gain anti-
trust protection during 1959 Senate hearing before Subcommittee on Anti-Trust
Monopoly).
24. For a further discussion of antitrust laws' paradoxical effect on NFL, see
infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
25. 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (limiting MLB's antitrust exemption to baseball
because "Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within
the scope of the federal antitrust laws").
26. MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 3, at xvii, 106 (explaining that AFL-NFL strug-
gle brought intrigue, publicity, creativity, and eventual merger); see also Sipusic,
supra note 3, at 214 (noting World Football League in 1970s and United States
Football League (USFL) in 1980s were temporary competitors of NFL). Profes-
sional football player salaries increased from $90,000 to $190,000 during the
USFL-NFL war in the mid-1980s. See KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE & TIMOTHY DAVIS,
THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS AGENTS 11 (University of Pennsylvania Press 2003) (not-
ing Stanford University economist Roger Knoll argues that competition between
leagues helps to increase player salaries).
27. See MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 229 (explaining how Rozelle had to
promise then-House Majority Leader Hale Boggs that NFL would bring franchise
to New Orleans in exchange for antitrust exemption); Professional Football League
Merger: Hearings on S. 3817 Before H. Comm. on Judiciary, 89th Cong. 2 (1966) ("The
Antitrust Subcommittee intends to explore thoroughly the extent of the antitrust
immunity requested. . . ." (quoting Chairman Immanuel Celler)). Interestingly,
Chairman Celler needed no such persuasion only fifteen years earlier when he
affirmed MLB's antitrust exemption. See SzvMANs~i & ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at
176-77 (citing Study of Monopoly Power Part 6: Organized Baseball: Before H. Subcomm.
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Both Rozelle's commitment to competitive balance and the
NFL's relationship with the AFL set the foundation for an ex-
tremely profitable business model.2 8 In contrast with baseball,
these factors help explain why NFL franchises are now significantly
more valuable than MLB franchises. 29
B. MLB History
Formed in 1876 and the first league to resemble present pro-
fessional sports leagues, the National League ("NL") foreshadowed
MLB's emergence. 30 Three years later and eleven years before the
enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act,31 the NL introduced the
reserve clause, essentially giving teams a permanent right to players
without having to worry about other teams competing for their
players' services.3 2 The reserve clause demonstrated the NL's
stronghold on the marketplace, which a team challenged in 1922
before the Supreme Court in Federal Base Ball [sic] Club of Baltimore
v. National League of Professional Base Ball [sic] Clubs.33
on Study of Monopoly Power, 82nd Cong. 2 (1951)) (noting Celler's Subcommittee
upheld validity of MLB's reserve clause).
28. For a further discussion of how Rozelle's insistence on equally dividing
television revenues embodies his commitment to competitive balance, see supra
note 21. For a more general discussion of the competitive balance issue, see infra
notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
29. See NFL Team Valuations, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2005/30/
Value_2.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2005) (listing value of all NFL franchises); MLB
Team Valuations, http://www.forbes.com/lists/results.jhtml (Sept. 15, 2005) (on
file with author) (listing value of all MLB franchises). According to Forbes Maga-
zine, the Boston Red Sox, the second most valuable MLB franchise at $563 million,
is worth less than the least valuable NFL franchise, the Minnesota Vikings at $658
million. Compare NFL Team Valuations, supra (noting value of Minnesota Vikings
franchise), with MLB Team Valuations, supra (noting value of Red Sox franchise).
30. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 261-62 (1972) (summarizing history of
baseball's early organized leagues); SzvsAS & ZIMBALIsT, supra note 3, at 29
(describing NL's creator William Hulbert as "a successful capitalist with a good
knowledge of commodity and financial markets as well as the emerging aggressive,
competitive practices of the robber baron era. .. ").
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-6 (2004) (prohibiting unreasonable restraints on trade).
32. See, e.g., SZYMANsKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 175 (noting NL openly
acknowledged reserve clause restrains trade). The reserve clause's introduction
logically follows Hulbert's vision of the NL, which was to reduce "the game to a
business system such as had never heretofore [been] obtained .... It was, in fact,
the irrepressible conflict between labor and capital asserting itself under a new
guise." Id. at 30 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Al Spalding, Hulbert's business
partner).
33. 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (establishing baseball's exemption from antitrust
laws). In Federal Base Ball [sic], the plaintiff, Baltimore's Federal Baseball League
team, alleged the NL destroyed the Federal League by essentially forcing all Fed-
eral League clubs, except plaintiffs, to join the NL. See id. at 207.
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1. MLB's Antitrust Exemption
In Federal Base Ball [sic], the Supreme Court skirted around
MLB's alleged antitrust violation by holding that interstate travel
accompanying the sport was merely incidental to "the exhibition,
[which] although made for money would not be called trade or
commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words. ''34 The
reserve clause evaded scrutiny until 1972 when the Supreme Court
affirmed its earlier decisions in Flood v. Kuhn35 and held the reserve
clause, particular to MLB, did not violate antitrust laws.3 6 Because
no other competitors could enter the market, MLB owners, unlike
their NFL counterparts, conducted their businesses without checks
from outside leagues to ensure fairness and progress.37
34. Id. at 209 (" [P] ersonal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of
commerce."). Thirty years later, the Supreme Court affirmed this holding in Tool-
son v. New York Yankees, Inc., where the Court held "if there are evils in this field
which now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legisla-
tion." 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (noting federal antitrust laws did not affect base-
ball over past thirty years). But see Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357-58 (Burton, J.,
dissenting) (arguing majority's holding, which effectively held MLB did not en-
gage in interstate commerce, drastically ignored changed state of professional
baseball since Federal Base Ball (sic]); Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 456 (1957)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Since I am unable to distinguish football from baseball
under the rationale of Federal Base Ball and Toolson, and can find no basis for attrib-
uting to Congress a purpose to put baseball in a class by itself, I would adhere to
the rule of stare decisis .... ").
35. 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (bringing free agency to professional sports). Curt
Flood, an African-American embittered after years of playing baseball throughout
the South, was an all-star centerfielder for the St. Louis Cardinals who fought the
reserve system. See DAVE ZIRIN, WHAT'S My NAME, FOOL? SPORTS AND RESISTANCE IN
THE UNITED STATES 103-04 (Haymarket Books 2005) (detailing influential letter
Flood wrote to then-Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn). Though he lost his case
before the Supreme Court, Curt Flood initiated the player movement toward free
agency, first introduced to professional team sports in the 1976 MLB CBA. See
SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 95-96, 230 (adding that Congress passed
Curt Flood Act in 1998, effectively declaring reserve system violates antitrust laws);
see also Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 26b(a) (2002) (stating MLB's business "di-
rectly relating to or affecting employment of major league baseball players ... [is]
subject to the antitrust laws . . ").
36. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282 ("With its reserve system enjoying exemption
from the federal antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception
and an anomaly."); see also Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 438
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (limiting baseball's antitrust exemption to reserve clause); But-
terworth v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021, 1025 (Fla. Supp.
2d 1994) (citing Piazza) (holding MLB's antitrust exemption applies only to re-
serve system).
37. See SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 213 (describing negative ef-
fects of MLB's antitrust exemption). Some argue the commissioner's office appro-
priately oversees the MLB; however, the MLB commissioner is an employee of the
owners whose responsibility is MLB's welfare (i.e., ensuring franchises remain via-
ble). See id. at 126-28 (explaining how MLB commissioner governs owners). The
commissioner's role is not to protect the welfare of baseball but, rather, is to guar-
antee MLB's profitability. See id. For a further discussion comparing the NFL to
433
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2. MLB's Television Contracts
In 1965, MLB followed the NFL's lead and signed a national
television contract distributing revenues equally among all teams .3
MLB's equal revenue sharing, however, significantly decreased in
1994 when teams began to sign large, local, undistributed television
contracts.3 9 Thus began the NFL's emergence as the nation's rich-
est sports league, evidenced by its recent record-breaking television
contract worth over $3.6 billion annually.40
C. Players' Unions
Paving the way for enormous revenue increases, television's
popularity rose rapidly during the 1950s. 41 The NFL and MLB
reaped these benefits throughout the 1960s and onward. 42 Signifi-
cantly higher revenues, combined with the labor movement occur-
ring outside the sports world, convinced NFL players that forming a
union was their best chance to increase their salaries.43 Yet despite
their unionization efforts and collective strikes, the nature of foot-
international soccer leagues, see infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of how MLB's antitrust exemption does not apply to the NFL, see supra
notes 24-27 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Radovich v. NFL's impor-
tance, see infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
38. See SzYMANs~i & ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 149 (noting in 1964, when CBS
bought New York Yankees and MLB unevenly distributed television agreement
with CBS, "CBS [effectively] paid itself two-thirds of MLB's rights fee"). This con-
tract would be expanded over the next four decades, during which time MLB pro-
duced a competitively balanced product which resembled the NFL's current even
distribution of talent. See id. (noting baseball's competitive balance increased be-
tween mid-1960s and early-1990s).
39. See id. at 150 (noting New York Yankees' local television contract, for ex-
ample, brought Yankees over $40 million annually).
40. For a further discussion of the NFL's lucrative television contracts, see
supra note 4.
41. See SzYMANsij & ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 148 (indicating 45.8 million
households had television by 1960, up from 10.5 million households in 1950); see
also MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 103-04 (noting there were 172,000 televisions
in the United States in 1948, and 25 million by 1954).
42. See ROBERT C. BERRY, WiLLIAM B. GOULD IV & PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, LABOR
RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 128 (Auburn House Publ'g Co. 1986) (recog-
nizing NFL's television contract expiring in 1981 paid each team $5.8 million an-
nually and 1982 contract paid each team $14.2 million annually); SZYMANSI &
ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 149 (charting MLB's average annual television network
revenues: $1.195 million in 1956, $3.25 million in 1960, $16.6 million in 1970,
$47.5 million in 1980, and $365 million in 1990). In 1967 the average NFL player
salary was $8,000, while MLB's was $19,000. See ZIRIN, supra note 35, at 102 (noting
typical professional athlete during 1960s had another job during off-season).
43. See MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 316 (explaining by 1970 players knew
of league's rising value and realized salaries remained static during exponential
growth of 1960s).
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ball and the NFL's relatively weaker union limit players' salaries to
this day.4
4
1. Effect of the Labor Movement
The labor movement, which began after the Depression in the
1930s, reformed the professional sports landscape by galvanizing
athletes and forcing them to realize that they were laborers in the
truest sense of the word.45 In addition, the tumultuous 1960s left
many athletes with greater awareness of surrounding societal trends
and a penchant for resistance.46
Marvin Miller embodied the labor movement's effect on the
unionization of professional athletes. 47 As the executive director of
the MLB Players Association ("MLBPA") from 1966-82 and the man
credited with bringing effective unionization to professional sports,
Miller worked for the War Labor Board and helped head the steel-
workers union before joining the sports world. 48 Miller established
the MLBPA as one of the strongest labor unions in the country, but
44. For a further discussion characterizing the nature of football, see infra
notes 186-93 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the weakness of
the NFL's players' union, see infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text. For a fur-
ther discussion on how the NFLPA needed the courts to affect change, see infra
notes 81-133 and accompanying text.
45. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 42, at 31 (indicating by mid-1970s labor rela-
tions began changing future of pro sports); ZIRN, supra note 35, at 106 (noting
prior to professional athletes' effective unionizing efforts, media outlets would
boast "that athletes are 'not real workers' and they don't have 'real strikes.' George
Meany, the first president of the AFL-CIO, . . . [once] said, 'I have no use for
ballplayers as union men. You'd never see the day when one of those high-priced
bozos would honor a picket line .... '); see also MAcI'u & LOVERRO, supra note 13,
at 186 (stating that owners resisted recognizing NFL players as legitimate labor
until early 1970s).
46. See ZIRIN, supra note 35, at 112 ("You now had at least some people who
were able to think in terms of what was wrong with the society, what was wrong with
the conditions, people much more accustomed to think about these things."
(quoting Marvin Miller)). David Meggyesy, NFLPA's current West Coast Director,
acknowledges the civil rights movement significantly influenced his union-oriented
politics. See id. at 114-23 (interviewing Meggyesy and noting his father's fight for
workers' rights also shaped Meggyesy's attitude toward management).
47. See id. at 102-03 (crediting Miller as "pioneer" who brought solidarity and
subsequently free agency to sports world). Soon after Miller took over the MLB
Players Association ("MLBPA"), Curt Flood, inspired by Miller, brought his chal-
lenge to the reserve clause which would eventually mark the beginning of free
agency. See id. at 103-05 (illustrating Flood's fight for free agency and resulting
mistreatment by MLB and anti-union players). Under Miller's reign, the average
player salary rose from $19,000 to over $240,000 per year. See id. at 107 (describing
Miller's significant role in reshaping sports' landscape). For a summary of Flood's
case, see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
48. See ZIRIN, supra note 35, at 108-10 (conveying that Miller also worked for
International Association of Machinists and United Auto Workers). In an inter-
view Miller explained:
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yet the NFLPA still has not heeded his lessons or adopted his hard-
lined positions.49
2. NFLPA versus MLBPA
Unlike the MLBPA's experience, poor bargaining strategies, a
lack of cohesiveness, and the nature of football plagues the
NFLPA.50 These factors led to unsuccessful strikes and, conse-
quently, lower wages and less guaranteed money for NFL players.51
My father .... was a member in the wholesale clothing workers union
.... [M]y mother . . .became one of the early members of the city's
teachers union. As the thirties progressed and the CIO [Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations] and industrialized unions formed, everybody was
aware of the ferment of the labor movement. All of these were influences.
... [Working for] the War Labor Board, I dealt with arbitrating steel,
auto, women in the workplace . . .and then the steelworkers [union]
starting in 1950, and I became chief economist and assistant to the presi-
dent ... until 1966.
Id. at 108, 110.
49. SeeMACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 317 ("[T]he NFLPA was never as radi-
cal as the [MLBPA]."); ZRIN, supra note 35, at 105 ("The way baseball players think
about it is guys before us have sacrificed to enable us to have a healthy game.
We're a strong union because we're all on the same page. We need to keep it that
way." (quoting MLB player)); see alsoJeffrey D. Schneider, Comment, Unsportsman-
like Conduct: The Lack of Free Agency in the NFL, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 797, 815 (1991)
(asserting NFLPA is only professional player union unable to improve its labor
market during last twenty years). There are, however, recent indications that the
NFLPA is ridding itself of its soft reputation. See The 50 Most Influential People in
Sports Business: #17. Gene Upshaw, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J., Dec. 19-25,
2005, at 29 (noting most recent labor negotiations between NFL and NFLPA re-
present distinct diversion from past dealings and NFLPA executive director Up-
shaw "proved he is no pushover"); The 50 Most Influential People in Sports Business:
#2. Paul Tagliabue, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J., Dec. 19-25, 2005, at 22 (char-
acterizing NFLPA as "a suddenly belligerent union").
50. See MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 317-72 (describing NFLPA's problems
during 1974 and 1982 strikes); BERRY ET AL., supra note 42, at 123 (indicating some
observers thought NFLPA "was relatively weak and lacked solidarity"); Powell v.
NFL (Powell I), 888 F.2d 559, 561 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting NFL players' strike only
lasted for one month during 1987 and players subsequently resorted to courts for
aid), superseded by, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989); see also Schneider, supra note 49,
at 814-15. The article explains:
Football differs from [other sports] in that a single player is less likely to
affect a game's outcome.... Moreover, there may not be an adequate
economic incentive to sign free agents in football. Unlike baseball and
perhaps basketball, it is doubtful that free agency boosts a football club's
ticket sales.
Schneider, supra note 49, at 814-15 (alterations in original) (quoting BERRY ET AL.,
supra note 42)). Additionally, an average football player's career lasts approxi-
mately three years, meaning any strike significantly limits a player's earning poten-
tial. See ZIRIN, supra note 35, at 105 (detailing NFL player strikes). For a further
discussion of football's violent nature, see infra notes 186-88 and accompanying
text.
51. See MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 367 (observing NFL players "had no
leverage" during 1987 strike); Schneider, supra note 49, at 815 (indicating NFL
[Vol. 13: p. 425
12
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol13/iss2/6
2006] DESPITE His ANTICS, T.O. HAS A VALID POINT 437
The MLBPA, on the other hand, witnessed much greater success
under Miller's direction.5 2
Powell v. NFL (Powell I1)53 demonstrates how the NFLPA inef-
fectively unionized professional football players.5 4 The Eighth Cir-
cuit determined that NFL players could not bring an antitrust
action challenging agreements made during the collective bargain-
ing process. 55 Bringing this action after again failing to mount an
effective strike, NFL players relied upon the historically manage-
ment-friendly courts to attack the owners' refusal to negotiate
outside of the 1982 CBA's terms.5 6 Not surprisingly, their attempt
was unsuccessful. 57
The MLBPA, as one of the strongest labor unions in the coun-
try, is a major reason why MLB players currently have a more devel-
oped free agency system than NFL players have.58 The prolonged
absence of an NFL free labor market is the source of NFL player
players made no progress toward free agency during 1982 strike). For an account
of the NFL's lack of guaranteed contracts, see infra notes 134-73 and accompany-
ing text.
52. See ZIRIN, supra note 35, at 111 ("They had an organization - a fake union
- called the Players Association that had been formed by the owners. This was a
company union in every sense of the word ...." (quoting Miller's description of
MLB player's union before he took it over)). For a further explanation how MLB
player salaries increased significantly under Miller's reign, see supra notes 47-49
and accompanying text.
53. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989). For a further discussion of the Powell cases,
see infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
54. For a further discussion of the NFLPA's failures and its subsequent reli-
ance on the courts, see infra notes 81-133 and accompanying text.
55. See Powell I, 930 F.2d at 1301-02 ("[T]he League and the Players have not
yet reached the point in negotiations where it would be appropriate to permit an
action under the Sherman Act.").
56. See Powell I, 888 F.2d 559, 561 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining NFL players
were trying to get rid of First Refusal/Compensation System, which they originally
agreed to in 1977 CBA). But see id. at 570 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (citing Mackey v.
NFL (Mackey II), 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976)) ("The labor exemption will not
immunize restraints which are unilaterally continued after impasse because such
restraints are not agreed to during good faith bargaining.").
57. See id. at 568 (holding antitrust laws inapplicable); Schneider, supra note
49, at 812 (arguing NFLPA, in both 1977 and 1982 collective bargaining agree-
ments, agreed to draft system closely resembling one declared anticompetitive in
Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
58. See SHIRLEY POVICH, ALL THOSE MORNINGS ... AT THE POST 342 (Public
Affairs 2005) ("[H]ave noted [the salary cap's] curse on football payrolls .... In
the baseball players' view, the football players were stupid to accept a salary cap
and they want none of it." (quoting column written on Sept. 15, 1994, [MLB play-
ers]); Kahn, Effects, supra note 11, at 296 (asserting free agency brought substantial
profits to player unions in basketball and baseball, while "NFL owners have effec-
tively blocked attempts by players to institute similar arrangements in football").
For further discussion on how the NFLPA needed the courts to effect change, see
infra notes 81-133 and accompanying text.
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holdouts and why T.O. and his colleagues should receive more
guaranteed money. 59
3. NFL Holdouts
The lack of guaranteed contracts in the NFL is the true source
of player holdouts. 60 Although holdout players renege on signed
agreements, standard contract provisions permit NFL owners to
prematurely cut an underperforming or injured player. 61 Further,
the recent media hysteria surrounding NFL player holdouts over-
59. See Schneider, supra note 49, at 798 (explaining origin of NFL player hold-
outs). Schneider describes the impact of the free labor market as follows:
Lately, many restrictions on the ability of athletes to move from em-
ployer to employer as "free agents" have been eliminated by court deci-
sions, arbitration decisions, and the combined efforts of players and team
owners to fashion mutually agreeable [CBAs]. As a result, athlete salaries
in most professional sports leagues have skyrocketed in recent years. This
trend, however, has not been as prevalent in the NFL. One result of this
increased free agency in the NBA and MLB has been a rash of player
"holdouts" in the NFL.
Id. (citations omitted).
60. For further discussion on why non-guaranteed contracts cause player
holdouts and how T.O.'s current contract epitomizes this problem, see infra notes
160-73 and accompanying text. The vast majority of NFL holdouts happen in two
different situations: 1) recently drafted rookies, especially first-round draft picks,
wait to ensure they get the full market value of their draft "slot"; 2) elite players in
the prime of their careers try to renegotiate their current deals to reflect their true
market value (this Comment's focus). See Basil M. Loeb, Comment, DeterringPlayer
Holdouts: Who Should Do It, How to Do It, and Why It Should be Done, 11 MARQ. SPORTS
L. REv. 275, 276 (2001) (explaining only premier players can effectively holdout);
Liz Mullen, What's the Holdup?, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J., Aug. 1-7, 2005, at
1 ("There is an almost institutionalized negotiation schedule that almost ensures
that most first rounders will be a day or two late [to training camp]." (quoting NFL
agent Leigh Steinberg)).
61. For further discussion on the relevant CBA provisions allowing owners to
sign non-guaranteed contracts, see infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
Nonetheless, some commentators only see the issue as one-sided, that "[n]o one,
including superstar athletes, should be above the law." Loeb, supra note 60, at 278
("Society would be outraged, for instance, if owners released a player and refused
to honor their existing obligations under a current and valid contract just because
the player happened to be performing poorly."). Interestingly, NFL franchise
owners can do just that. For further discussion on the relevant provisions from the
NFL's CBA allowing owners to cut players for underperformance, see infra note
178. Another commentator suggests, "Surely, it would not be fair for an architect,
who contracted to build a four-story building for $4 million, to threaten to walk off
the job after completing the first two floors unless the owner promised to pay an
additional $2 million." Daniel M. Walanka, Comment, An Alternative Approach to the
Problem of Midterm Demands for Contract Renegotiation in the National Football League:
The Incentive-Based Contract, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 771, 771 (1997) (suggesting NFL
players violate contract law with their mid-term demands for contract renegotia-
tions). Again, this analogy falls short because the building owner, unlike NFL own-
ers, cannot stop payment after the architect has built the second floor. For a
further discussion of non-guaranteed contracts in the NFL, see infra notes 134-81
and accompanying text.
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looks the league's extensive holdout history and the effect of a cur-
rently un-renewed CBA terminating in 2008.62
In light of these concerns, this year's increased number of
holdouts does not pose a great threat to the NFL's viability. 63
Rookie and even veteran holdouts should decline with the signing
of a new CBA that brings a larger share of team revenue to play-
ers.64 Regardless, threatened holdouts like T.O.'s will continue un-
til guaranteed contracts become more prevalent. 65 Non-
guaranteed contracts leave too much at risk for some of the world's
most talented athletes.66
Professional football players play in the world's wealthiest
sports league - a product of many favorable historical factors, court
rulings, savvy leaders, and a format prime for television consump-
tion. 67 Yet NFL players, due to a history of poor unionization and
ineffective bargaining strategies, never dealt at arm's length with
62. See John Clayton, NFL Has Rich Holdout History, July 29, 2005, http://
proxy.espn.go.com/nfl/trainingcamp05/columns/story?columnist=clayton-
john&id=2116504 (describing significant player holdouts from 1985-1987 and as-
serting "[t]he days of the mega holdouts are a distant memory"); John Clayton,
Lack of New CBA Deal Slowing Down Progress, July 26, 2005, http://proxy.espn.go.
com/nfl/trainingcamp05/columns/story?columnist=clayton-john&id=2115828
[hereinafter Clayton, Lack of New CBA] (stating holdouts were large problem
before NFL instituted salary cap, with 758 veteran player holdouts between 1987-
1991); see also Dave Goldberg, High-Profile Rosenhaus Clients Show Up, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, July 29, 2005, at 4B (summarizing big-name 2005 holdouts and noting
many of Rosenhaus's clients did not holdout despite threatening to do so); Clay-
ton, Lack of New CBA, supra (explaining NFL holdouts, bucking recent trend,
slightly increased in 2005 due to un-renewed CBA).
63. See Clayton, Lack of New CBA, supra note 62 ("Though it's hard to believe
based on this [2005] summer's negotiating panic, the current system usually mini-
mizes holdouts.").
64. See id. (asserting owners should extend current CBA to prevent rookie
holdouts); see also Daniel Kaplan, NFL Open to Sharing All Local Revenue: League and
NFLPA to Meet This Week, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J., Feb. 14-20, 2005, at 1
(stating for new CBA "[t]he NFL is willing to share all local and national revenue
with its players .... marking a seismic shift in how America's top sport operates").
65. For a further discussion of how contracts like T.O.'s mislead fans, see infra
notes 160-73 and accompanying text. For a further discussion identifying the seri-
ous injury risk for NFL players, see infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Walker Tears ACL, To Miss Rest of Season, Sept. 12, 2005, http://
sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2159192 (recounting how Pro-Bowl wide
receiver threatened to, but did not, holdout, injured himself during 2005 season's
first game, and consequently limited his earning potential); WR Terrell Among 17
Players Cut, Sept. 3, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section=nfl&id=
2151134 (detailing how New England Patriots signed wide receiver David Terrell
in April to one-year contract and subsequently cut him before season even
started). For a further discussion on how Javon Walker fired Rosenhaus for mak-
ing his contract negotiations susceptible to media influence, see supra note 10.
67. For a further discussion of important historical NFL developments, see
supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
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the owners, a group of razor-sharp business people who carefully
crafted their labor relationship with their employees. 68 These fac-
tors attributed to the current CBA, which depresses players' guaran-
teed incomes and allows teams to freely cut unwanted players. 69
Considering this history, especially when compared to the MLB's
past, NFL players face a steep uphill battle against accumulating
forces and could possibly look to legal means to guarantee their
contracts. Court decisions, however, suggest that the NFL's anti-
trust and contractual frameworks would not provide much
assistance. 70
III. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The lack of guaranteed contracts in the NFL stems from prac-
tice, not precedent. 71 Beginning with the Supreme Court in
Radovich v. NFL, courts have consistently found "the volume of in-
terstate business involved in organized professional football places
it within the provisions of the [Sherman Antitrust] Act."72 While
the NFL benefits from courts' interpretations of antitrust laws, NFL
players have not reaped their fair share. 73 This stems, in part, from
the Fourth Circuit's holding in Tillman v. New Orleans Saints Football
Club,74 which permitted teams to unilaterally cut injured or un-
68. For a further discussion comparing the NFLPA to the MLBPA, see supra
notes 50-59 and accompanying text. For a further discussion describing sports
franchise owners as acute business people, see supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
69. For a further discussion of the relevant provisions of the NFL's CBA, see
infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the possible
positive impact of teams' ability to cut underperforming or injured athletes, see
infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text. For a list of unwanted star players re-
cently cut by their teams, see infra note 170.
70. For a further discussion of the relevant antitrust law, see infra notes 81-133
and accompanying text. For a further discussion demonstrating that the courts
permitted non-guaranteed contracts in the NFL, see infra notes 138-51 and accom-
panying text.
71. For a further discussion demonstrating how precedent does not account
for the lack of guaranteed contracts in the NFL, see infra notes 174-78 and accom-
panying text.
72. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1957) (holding professional base-
ball's antitrust exemption was unique to baseball); see also Kapp v. NFL, 390 F.
Supp. 73, 79 (N.D. Cal. 1974) ("[P]rofessional football league activity, unlike simi-
lar baseball activity, is subject to the antitrust laws."), vacated in part, 1975 WL 959
(N.D. Cal. 1975) (citing Radovich).
73. For a further discussion of how competition from outside leagues helped
improve and shape the NFL's product, see supra notes 22-27 and accompanying
text.
74. 265 So. 2d 284 (4th Cir. 1972), superseded by statute, L. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
3494 (1983).
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derperforming players. 75 Once teams were allowed this leeway, the
league ensured that its CBA with the players would not restrict this
freedom.76
Nonetheless, MLB's CBA does not require teams to sign guar-
anteed contracts. 77 Guaranteed contracts in professional baseball
resulted from the nature of the sport; a baseball player's athletic
prowess is not subject to the intense physical wear and tear that a
football player suffers throughout his career.78 Regardless of the
NFL's high injury risk, its players still generate revenues and profits
for team owners that far exceed any other sport.79 Therefore, de-
spite some limiting factors, NFL players should receive more guar-
anteed money.80
A. Antitrust Laws & the NFL
As discussed earlier, the NFL benefited from the Supreme
Court's initial holding in Toolson limiting the antitrust exemption to
MLB. 81 Courts reinforced this ruling throughout the following
four decades and seemed to give NFL players a legitimate chance at
receiving their fair market value.8 2 Nevertheless, after the Eighth
Circuit invalidated the Rozelle Rule in Mackey v. NFL (Mackey I1),83
"[o] nce again, the NFLPA bargained away another hard-fought le-
75. See id. at 285-87 (upholding validity of NFL Standard Player's Contract,
which allowed teams to cut ineffective players). For a copy of the current NFL
Player's Contract, see Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL Manage-
ment Council and the NFL Player's Association (as amended Feb. 25, 1998), App.
C, at 229, http://www.nflpa.org/members/main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete
[hereinafter NFL CBA] (demonstrating NFL standard contract has not signifi-
cantly changed over last thirty years).
76. For a discussion of relevant CBA provisions, see infra notes 176-78 and
accompanying text.
77. For a further discussion comparing the MLB's CBA with the NFL's CBA,
see infra note 176.
78. For a further discussion of the NFL's violent nature and high injury rate,
see infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
79. For a further discussion of the NFL's revenues and television deals, see
supra note 4.
80. For a further discussion identifying the factors which would still limit indi-
vidual NFL player salaries, regardless of the league's financial success, see infra
notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
81. For a further discussion of how courts' interpretations of antitrust laws
have financially benefited the NFL, see supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
82. For a summary of the relevant major cases and their effects, see infra notes
85-133 and accompanying text.
83. 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976) ("[T]he Rozelle Rule, as enforced, un-
reasonably restrains trade in violation of ... the Sherman Act.").
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gal victory" by agreeing to a modified reserve system under the 1977
CBA.8 4
1. Radovich v. NFL (1957)
Plaintiff William Radovich played for the Detroit Lions, a Na-
tional League team, until 1945 when he broke his contract with the
Lions to play for the Los Angeles Dons of the All-American Confer-
ence from 1946-47.85 The San Francisco Clippers, a member of a
league affiliated with the National League, offered Radovich a con-
tract in 1948.86 But the Clippers rescinded the offer after the Na-
tional League blacklisted Radovich and threatened penalties for
"any affiliated club signing him .... ",87
The Supreme Court held that it should test Radovich's claim
"under the Sherman Act's general prohibition on unreasonable re-
straints of trade" and that Radovich's case met the Act's injury re-
quirement.8 8 Though leaving the final decision to the trial court,
the Supreme Court accepted the argument that the National
League's blacklisting policy attempted to monopolize the business
of professional football and thus illegally restrained trade.89
This early legal victory could have severely debilitated the own-
ers' power to control the NFL's labor market because antitrust law
would now check any league action.90 Nonetheless, NFL players
84. Schneider, supra note 49, at 814 (noting NFLPA lost 1980 arbitration case
challenging reserve system under 1977 CBA). The court in Mackey II defined the
Rozelle Rule as follows:
The Rozelle Rule essentially provides that when a player's contrac-
tual obligation to a team expires and he signs with a different club, the
signing club must provide compensation to the player's former team. If
the two clubs are unable to conclude mutually satisfactory arrangements,
the Commissioner may award compensation in the form of one or more
players and/or draft choices as he deems fair and equitable.
543 F.2d at 609 n.1; see also Mitch Truelock, Free Agency in the NFL: Evolution or
Revolution?, 47 SMU L. REV. 1917, 1925-26 (1994) (explaining Rozelle Rule).
85. See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 448 (1957) (noting Radovich sought
transfer to Los Angeles because his father was ill).
86. See id. (recounting Radovich's complaint).
87. Id. ("This black-listing effectively prevented [Radovich's] employment in
organized professional football in the United States.").
88. Id. at 453 (quoting Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594, 614 (1953)) (adding that private party could bring action alleging violation of
antitrust laws). But see id. at 455 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (expressing concern
over majority's adherence to stare decisis).
89. See id. at 448-49, 454 ("[S]tandard player contract[s] .... are enforced by
agreement of the clubs to black-list any player violating them and to visit severe
penalties on recalcitrant member clubs.").
90. See Radovich, 352 U.S. at 453-54 (concluding private litigant only needs to
meet minimum requirements of Sherman Act and section five of Clayton Act).
Radovich was the first case where a plaintiff brought an antitrust action directly
[Vol. 13: p. 425
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did not capitalize on Radovich's potential implications because own-
ers used their leveraged bargaining position throughout the 1960s
and 1970s to effectively restrain trade and minimize player
compensation. 9'
2. Kapp v. NFL (1974)
Plaintiff Joe Kapp played quarterback in the Canadian Football
League from 1959-66 after the Washington Redskins drafted but
refused to sign him. 92 In 1967, Kapp signed a three-year contract
with the Minnesota Vikings only after the Vikings, pursuant to the
Draft Rule, satisfied the Washington Redskins' demands. 93 After
leading the Vikings to the NFL Championship in 1969, Kapp be-
came a hot commodity. 94 The Rozelle Rule, however, limited his
options, and Kapp eventually signed with the New England Patriots
only after the Vikings and Patriots reached a transfer agreement. 95
Finally, Kapp refused to sign the Standard Player Contract ("SPC")
following the 1971 season and brought an action alleging certain
rules in the NFL Constitution and Bylaws amounted to a per se vio-
lation of federal antitrust laws. 96
against the NFL. Until Radovich, Toolson's holding in dictum that baseball's anti-
trust exemption was unique to baseball was merely instructive. See Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (declining to apply federal antitrust
laws to baseball). For a further discussion summarizing Toolson's holding, see supra
note 25.
91. For a further discussion of the NFLPA's relative weakness, see supra notes
50-59 and accompanying text.
92. See Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 75-76 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (noting Kapp
could not sign with other NFL team pursuant to Draft Rule, which provided that
selecting club did not even have to make offer while still denying player's right to
negotiate with other teams). The court also identified the Tampering Rule, which
states "that if a member club shall tamper, negotiate with or make an offer to a
player on the active, reserve or selection list of another club, then the offending
club" would suffer significant penalties. Id. at 76.
93. See id. (observing Vikings had to pay Kapp's Canadian Football League
team $50,000 for his release). For an explanation of the Draft Rule, see supra note
92.
94. See Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 76 (acknowledging other teams sought Kapp's
talents but did not offer contract to Kapp).
95. See id. at 76-77 (explaining Rozelle Rule and noting Patriots, in return for
Kapp, gave Vikings their first round draft choices from 1972 draft and their first
draft selection from 1967 draft). For a definition of the Rozelle Rule, see supra
note 84.
96. See Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 77 (acknowledging Option Rule, "which gives the
employing club an [sic] unilateral option to renew the contract for a further term
of one year at a reduced rate of compensation," and SPC Rule, which requires
player to sign SPC before playing or practicing with team). Kapp also argued "the
combination is illegal even under the 'rule of reason' because the restraint obvi-
ously goes far beyond what would be reasonably necessary to achieve the business
goals involved .... ." Id. at 78 (citing, for example, Int'l Salt v. United States, 332
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Acknowledging that the challenged league rules were probably
a per se violation of antitrust laws, the court in Kapp held the chal-
lenged rules violated the Sherman Act under the reasonableness
test as well.9 7 The court held, for example, the Rozelle Rule would
"perpetually restrain a player from pursuing his occupation among
the clubs of a league that holds a virtual monopoly of professional
football employment in the United States." 98
NFL players' fight for contracting freedom started with Joe
Kapp. 99 The Ninth Circuit, however, rendered the district court's
ruling moot when it found Kapp could not prove any damages. 100
Nonetheless, Kapp's case became a stepping-stone for players to
bring further legal action against team owners. 10 1
U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., 325 F. Supp. 1049,1066
(C.D. Cal. 1971)) (indicating Kapp challenged Draft Rule, Tampering Rule, Ro-
zelle Rule, SPC Rule, and One-Man Rule, which vested "the power to make final
interpretations and decisions in the Commissioner"). For a current version of the
NFL's SPC, see NFL CBA, supra note 75, at 229.
97. See Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 81-82 (illustrating why reasonableness test was
more appropriate and granting summary judgment because "the challenged rules
[are] so patently unreasonable that there is no genuine issue for trial"). The court
concluded:
[The challenged rules] imposing restraint virtually unlimited in time
and extent, [go] far beyond any possible need for fair protection of the
interests of the club-employers of the purposes of the NFL and that [the
rules impose] upon the player-employees such undue hardship as to be
an unreasonable restraint and such [rules are] not susceptible of differ-
ent inferences concerning [their] reasonableness ....
Id. at 82 (explaining why Rozelle Rule, Draft Rule, One-Man Rule and Tampering
Rule violated antitrust laws). The court held the Option Rule did not violate anti-
trust laws because teams and players could freely negotiate a contract's length and
salary. See id. at 82-83 ("[O]ption provision cannot be said to so extend the origi-
nal term and salary as to render it patently unreasonable."); see also Mackey v. NFL,
543 F.2d 606, 619-21 (8th Cir. 1976) (characterizing differences between per se
test and Rule of Reason test);John R. Gerba, Comment, Instant Replay: A Review of
the Case of Maurice Clarett, the Application of the Non-Statutoiy Labor Exemption, and Its
Protection of the NFL Draft Eligibility Rule, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2383, 2390-94 (2005)
(discussing how Rule of Reason, which is identical to reasonableness test, and per
se analysis have been applied in sports-related cases).
98. Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 82 (demonstrating why Rozelle Rule presented
problems under antitrust laws).
99. See Backman, supra note 3, at 11 (observing NFLPA's formation in 1968
laid groundwork for Kapp's legal action).
100. See id. at 12 n.63 (noting Ninth Circuit's "holding also serves to eliminate
any harm the NFL may have suffered by virtue of the summary judgment and to
deprive the NFL of its standing as grievant" (quoting Kapp v. NFL, 586 F.2d 644,
650 (9th Cir. 1978))).
101. See id. at 12 (portraying Kapp as precursor to Mackey). Backman argues
"the players would advance to the next round of their fight-this time with the
NFLPA solidly behind them." Id. (transitioning to discussion of Mackey). This as-
sertion, however, is misleading because the NFLPA failed to capitalize on Mackey's
holding in the two subsequent CBAs signed in 1977 and 1982. See id. at 17-19
(recognizing NFLPA gave up free agency for increased financial benefits). For a
[Vol. 13: p. 425
20
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol13/iss2/6
2006] DESPITE His ANTIcs, T.O. HAS A VALID POINT
3. Mackey v. NFL (Mackey I)
John Mackey and thirty-five other NFL players originally filed
suit in Minnesota District Court claiming that the Rozelle Rule vio-
lated the Sherman Act by unreasonably restraining trade. 10 2 In re-
sponse, owners argued the Rozelle Rule received immunity from
antitrust analysis under the nonstatutory labor exemption ("NLE")
because players mutually agreed to the Rozelle Rule through the
1968 and 1970 CBAs. 10
3
The district court disagreed with the owners and held the Ro-
zelle Rule violated the Sherman Act under both the per se analysis
and the Rule of Reason test.10 4 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's holding, but it determined the Rozelle
Rule was invalid only under the Rule of Reason test because "the
unique nature of the business of professional football renders it in-
appropriate to mechanically apply per se illegality rules .... "
Furthermore, before concluding that the Rozelle Rule violated anti-
trust laws, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding
further discussion identifying the NFLPA's inability to translate legal successes into
successes at the bargaining table, see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
For a further discussion of how the NFLPA continued to acquiesce to owners' de-
mands despite Mackey, see infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
102. See Mackey v. NFL (Mackey I), 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (D. Minn. 1975)
(noting plaintiffs claimed Rozelle Rule violates Rule of Reason standard even if
Rozelle Rule does not per se violate antitrust laws), rev'd on other grounds, Mackey II,
543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976).
103. See id. at 1002-03 (describing NFL's defenses); Backman, supra note 3, at
13 n.67 ("Labor policy clashes with antitrust policy when the two parties to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement negotiate in good faith over a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining, and the negotiation results in a restraint on employee move-
ment that would normally be a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act." (quot-
ing Bradley S. Albert & Brian K. Albert, Fourth and Goal It's Time for Congress to
Tackle the Nonstatutoy Labor Exemption, 2 SPORTS LAw. J. 185, 195 (1995))).
104. See Mackey 1, 407 F. Supp. at 1007-08 (holding Rozelle Rule was "per se
violation of the antitrust laws" and "invalid under the Rule of Reason standard").
The Rule of Reason test used in Mackey I is identical to the reasonableness test used
in Kapp. Compare id. at 1006-07 (explaining why Rozelle Rule unreasonably re-
strained trade), with Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 81 (listing several factors to consider
when determining reasonableness of restraint on trade).
105. Mackey II, 543 F.2d at 619 (adding that per se test is particularly inappro-
priate here because "the alleged restraint does not completely eliminate competi-
tion for players' services"). The Rule of Reason test determines "whether the
restraint imposed is justified by legitimate business purposes, and is no more re-
strictive than necessary." Id. at 620; see also Backman, supra note 3, at 15 n.78 (ob-
serving Eighth Circuit held NFL cannot circumvent antitrust laws by characterizing
league as joint venture but is entitled to examination under Rule of Reason
analysis).
445
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that the NLE did not apply because the Rozelle Rule was not the
result of "bona fide arm's-length bargaining."'1 06
As previously noted, the Mackey I!decision did not immediately
lead to greater labor freedom for NFL players. 10 7 But when the
players went on strike at the beginning of the 1987 season, they
vowed to sit out the entire season if unrestricted free agency was not
included in the new CBA. 10 8 Not surprisingly, the players caved
only twenty-four days later, returned to the playing field without
making any progress toward unrestricted free agency, and turned to
the courts once again for assistance.10 9
4. Powell v. NFL (Powell I)
On October 15, 1987, the NFLPA filed suit in Powell v. NFL
(Powell 1), attempting to enjoin the NFL from enforcing the alleged
antitrust violations contained in the 1982 CBA. 0 It would take two
more decisions, Powell II and Powell III, before the courts ruled on
this matter. 1 '
a. Powell I & Powell II
The central issue before the district court in Powell I was
"whether the nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws
continues to protect the allegedly unlawful system of player re-
straints following expiration of the collective bargaining agreement,
and if so, for how long."'1 2 Holding antitrust policy demands ex-
pired CBAs "survive" for NLE purposes, the court in Powell I con-
106. Mackey II, 543 F.2d at 616 ("[W]e find substantial evidence to support
the finding that there was no bona fide arm's-length bargaining over the Rozelle
Rule preceding the execution of the 1968 and 1970 [CBAs] .... [l]ts form has
remained unchanged since it was unilaterally promulgated by the clubs in 1963.").
107. For a further discussion of the NFLPA's inability to capitalize on Mackey
Ifs holding, see supra note 84.
108. See Backman, supra note 3, at 20 (noting players had new strategy when
1982 CBA ended in 1987).
109. See id. (describing 1987 strike: "Unable to resolve matters on their own,
the players filed suit and NLRB actions against League owners on the last day of
the strike .... ").
110. See Powell v. NFL (Powell I), 678 F. Supp. 777, 781 (D. Minn. 1988) (not-
ing plaintiffs' motive for bringing action was unrestricted free agency), rev'd, Pow-
ell 11, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
111. See Backman, supra note 3, at 21 (observing Powell required three pro-
ceedings to fully settle claims).
112. Powell I, 678 F. Supp. at 782 (citations omitted) (identifying NLE as key
issue before court). For a further discussion of the NLE and its effect on the 1968,
1970, 1977, and 1982 CBAs, see supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
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cluded expired CBAs terminate when parties reach a bargaining
impasse.113
In Powell II, the court found the NFLPA and NFL reached a
bargaining impasse, and therefore, the NLE no longer shielded the
expired 1982 CBA from antitrust scrutiny.11 4 This decision, com-
bined with Powell f's holding, laid the foundation for a trial on
whether the 1982 CBA violated antitrust laws. 1 5
b. Powell III
The Eighth Circuit in Powell III addressed two critical issues.1 16
First, the court considered if the NFL could use the NLE after the
1982 CBA expired and held the NLE could be invoked in particular
circumstances after a CBA ended.117 Second, the court concluded
the NLE still protected the NFL in this case, and the NLE would
insulate the league until a CBA no longer existed.11 8
Powell III left the NFLPA back at the bargaining table, the own-
ers' domain over the last thirty years. 1 9 Following suit, the owners
forced NFL players to agree to one of two proposals regarding free
agency. 120 Regardless, Powell III still represented a critical step to-
113. See Powell I, 678 F. Supp. at 788 (citing Taft Broad. Co., 163 NLRB 475,
478 (1967)) (holding test for determining impasse is "whether, following intense,
good faith negotiations, the parties have exhausted the prospects of concluding an
agreement").
114. See Powell v. NFL (Powell II), 690 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Minn. 1988)
(concluding parties bargained to impasse over free agency).
115. See Backman, supra note 3, at 24 (describing events and holdings that led
to Powell III).
116. See id. at 25 (observing Eighth Circuit disagreed with players' assertion,
which argued decision in favor of League would overrule court's earlier Mackey
decision).
117. See Powell v. NFL (Powell III), 930 F.2d 1293, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1989)
("[O]nce an impasse in bargaining is established, employers become entitled to
implement new or different employment terms that are reasonably contemplated
within the scope of their pre-impasse proposals." (citing Laborers Health & Wel-
fare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 543 n.5
(1988))).
118. See id. at 1303 (explaining why labor policy should trump antitrust policy
in this case). The court declined to determine when the labor exemption expired.
See id. at 1303-04 (suggesting players have three alternative options: further bar-
gaining, striking, or bringing claim to NLRB).
119. For a further discussion of Radovich, Kapp, and Mackey and how the
NFLPA failed to capitalize on each decision, see supra notes 83-109 and accompa-
nying text.
120. See Backman, supra note 3, at 27 (describing Powell III's aftermath). The
players thought both proposals fell short:
In the players' view.., the two proposals did little to improve the
current [CBA], and Gene Upshaw, president of the NFLPA, shot down
both proposals stating, "[m]anagement's proposal A and proposal B are
really proposal bad and proposal worse for the players." Regardless,
23
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ward free agency. 121 Judge Gerald Heaney's dissent suggested a key
strategic move that soon became the lynchpin in the players' strug-
gle for an open labor market - decertification of the union to avoid
the league's NLE. 122
5. McNeil v. NFL (1991)
NFL players believed that decertifying the NFLPA would allow
them to attack Plan B's antitrust violations without owners relying
on the NLE.l2 3 When the 1990 season concluded, eight individual
players brought suit claiming Plan B restricted player movement
and prevented competitive renegotiating of expired contracts. 124
Following some influential pretrial rulings, 125 the jury trial began
with plaintiff-players additionally alleging Plan B financially injured
them by decreasing possible compensation. 126 The jury found that
although Plan B reinforced competitive balance, it also significantly
backed by the ruling from Powell III, the NFL proceeded to unilaterally
implement Plan B.
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Plan B severely restricted player-
movement while offering essentially no incentives. See id.; Truelock, supra note 84,
at 1938 (noting Plan B allowed NFL teams to protect thirty-seven roster players at
conclusion of each season, making other players unrestricted free agents).
121. For a further discussion explaining how the NFLPA advantageously used
Powell II's dissent, see infra note 122 and accompanying text.
122. See Powell III, 930 F.2d at 1306 (Heaney, J., dissenting) ("It follows that
the end result of the majority opinion is that once a union agrees to a package of
player restraints, it will be bound to that package forever unless the union forfeits
its bargaining rights."); see also Truelock, supra note 84, at 1939 (observing players'
only remaining strategic move was decertification).
123. See Backman, supra note 3, at 29 n.178 ("If the players chose to continue
to bargain in hopes of removing Plan B in a new CBA, the League would continue
to be protected by the nonstatutory labor exemption."); Powell v. NFL (McNeil I),
764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (D. Minn. 1991) (explaining NFLPA's decertification ef-
forts and noting players re-characterized union as "a voluntary professional associa-
tion"). In McNeil I, the court held the balance of interests prevented the parties
from consolidating the lawsuit. See 764 F. Supp. at 1359-60 (ordering defendants
could not consolidate Powell and McNeil). For a further description of Plan B, see
supra note 120.
124. See McNeil I, 764 F. Supp. at 1354 ("Plaintiffs claim that the NFL players
have chosen to end their union representation in order to clear the way for anti-
trust claims by individual players.").
125. See McNeil v. NFL (McNeil II), 790 F. Supp. 871, 874 (D. Minn. 1992)
(listing important and relevant pretrial motions and rulings); Backman, supra note
3, at 31-37 (citing McNeil 1); Truelock, supra note 84, at 1939-44 (summarizing
court's holding of parties' motions for summary judgments).
126. See McNeil v. NFL (McNeil III), 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21561, at *1 (D.
Minn. 1992) (announcing players' claim Plan B "depriv[ed] them of the opportu-
nity to freely offer their services as professional football players to other teams and
caus[ed] them to receive less compensation").
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decreased competition for player services and economically injured
players. 127
McNeil v. NFL was "the most important decision ever to affect
professional football" because it significantly leveled the playing
field. 128 Additionally, the decision appeased both sides and soon
led to the 1993 CBA, which included the first form of unrestricted
free agency in the NFL.'2 9 Two weeks after McNeil, five new NFL
players filed a similar class action suit that the parties settled and
eventually incorporated into the 1993 CBA, ending the tumultuous
period between 1987-92.130
Ironically, the NFLPA's decertification was its most effective
strategy during its struggle for free agency. 31 Considering the
NFLPA's earlier feeble bargaining position and its inability to
mount an effective strike, this comes as no surprise.13 2 The courts
saved NFL players from a permanently restrained labor market;
however, the courts would not be similar safe-havens during play-
ers' attempts to achieve guaranteed contracts. 133
127. See Backman, supra note 3, at 39 (citing McNeil III) (adding that Plan B
was unreasonably restrictive). Interestingly, owners argued the eight female jurors
unfairly disadvantaged the NFL's case in McNeil III. See id. 37-38 (noting team
owner Pat Bowlen stated: "I do not want eight women who are basically domestic
housewives to decide the future of the National Football League.").
128. Truelock, supra note 84, at 1939 (characterizing McNeil as watershed de-
cision in NFL's labor relationship).
129. See Backman, supra note 3, at 40 (asserting court in McNeil satisfied play-
ers by declaring Plan B restriction of free trade and appeased owners by denying
players unrestricted free agency). The key points in the 1993 CBA include: 1)
players with at least five years of experience become unrestricted free agents, 2)
teams could restrict the movement of one "franchise player" by paying him the
average salary of the five top players at that position or 120% of his previous-year
salary, 3) teams could restrict the movement of "transition players" by paying him
the average salary of the top ten players or 120% of his previous-year salary, 4)
teams were afforded "restricted free agency" and "exclusive rights free agency" in
certain situations, and 5) teams enforced a strict salary cap. See id. at 43-48 (citing
1993 CBA between NFL Management Council and NFLPA).
130. See White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1395 (D. Minn. 1993) ("The settle-
ment [of Plan B challenges] is the critical step toward the final resolution of the
longstanding dispute between the NFL clubs and their player-employees."); see also
Truelock, supra note 84, at 1945 (describing how court settled White and how play-
ers agreed to new seven-year CBA).
131. For a further discussion of the significance of decertifying, see supra note
122 and accompanying text.
132. For a further discussion indicating that the NFLPA was a weak union, see
supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text. On March 29, 1993, the NFL voluntarily
recognized the NFLPA after a majority of players signed authorization cards and
the American Arbitration Association acknowledged the NFLPA. See White, 822 F.
Supp. at 1435 (summarizing NFLPA's recertification process).
133. For a further discussion of two cases epitomizing how courts handle
guaranteed contracts in the NFL, see infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
NFL players began fighting for guaranteed contracts during the early 1970s. See
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B. Guaranteed Contracts & the NFL
Guaranteed contracts were never part of the NFL's landscape;
courts have not forced them upon the league and owners have re-
mained steadfast in their refusal to offer them. 134 The CBA pro-
vides little in regards to guaranteed compensation and permits
teams to cut players almost at will. 135 Nonetheless, the CBA basi-
cally encourages signing bonuses, which guarantee money while de-
tracting criticism from the pressing issue. 136 NFL players deserve
better contracts so that teams cannot freely recycle some of the
world's most sought after athletes. 13 7
1. The Courts
Tillman v. New Orleans Saints Football Club138 epitomizes how
courts handle NFL contract cases. 139 Plaintiff Tillman, a profes-
sional football player, tore a knee ligament during a preseason
practice and underwent surgery and a rigorous rehabilitation pro-
gram.140 Three months after the injury, a team physician deemed
Tillman ready to play football.1 4 1 One week later, defendant New
Orleans Saints Football Club ("Saints") terminated Tillman's con-
tract pursuant to contractual provisions that allowed a team to do
so if the player failed to maintain his physical condition or did not
MAcKEY & LovERRo, supra note 13, at 186 (indicating NFLPA fought for guaran-
teed contracts during its nascent stages of early 1970s).
134. For a discussion of the relevant court decisions, see infra notes 138-48
and accompanying text. For a further discussion explaining why NFL owners re-
fuse to offer guaranteed contracts, see infra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
The owners' recent efforts to keep guaranteed contracts out of the NFL is reminis-
cent of MLB owners in 1926. See PovicH, supa note 58, at 16-18 (referencing
article written on December 22, 1926) (noting how MLB owners conspired to rid
league of long-term contracts).
135. For a further discussion of the NFL's CBA and comparisons to the MLB's
CBA and the National Basketball Association's ("NBA") CBA, see infra notes 175-
81 and accompanying text.
136. For a further discussion of signing bonuses in the NFL, see infra notes
152-73 and accompanying text.
137. For arguments supporting guaranteed contracts in the NFL, see infra
notes 152-206 and accompanying text. For further discussion on the incredibly
high demand for NFL players, see infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
138. 265 So. 2d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 1972) (setting precedent for NFL contract
cases).
139. See Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Employer's Termination of Professional
Athlete's Services as Constituting Breach of Employment Contract, 57 A.L.R.3d 257, 263-64
(2004) (citing Tillman as exemplary NFL contract case).
140. See Tillman, 265 So. 2d at 285-86 (establishing plaintiff's case).
141. See id. at 286 (determining if Tillman was physically ready to play when
team terminated contract).
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perform to the team's satisfaction. 142 Finding Tillman was healthy
when the Saints terminated his contract, the Fourth Circuit upheld
the team's dismissal because it was in accordance with the con-
tract's terms.
143
Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club144 is similarly instruc-
tive. 145 The defendant's team physician announced plaintiff-player
Gambrell could resume playing football, at which point Gambrell
claimed he still suffered from the back injury that occurred two
months earlier. 46 Subsequently, the team released Gambrell pur-
suant to the contractual provisions cited in Tillman.1 47 Gambrell
stands for the principle "that there exists in an employment con-
tract an implied condition that the employee is physically able to
perform his obligations thereunder, and that consequently an em-
ployer is justified in terminating an employee who is physically inca-
pable of performing his contractual obligations."' 148
Though the courts had little direct impact on ensuring any
type of guaranteed salaries for NFL players, the courts did play an
142. See id. at 285 (noting Tillman alleged Saints could not waive him because
his injury persisted when team terminated his contract). The contract's relevant
provision stated:
If in the opinion of the Head Coach the Player does not maintain
himself in excellent physical condition . . . or if in the opinion of the
Head Coach the Player's work or conduct in the performance of this con-
tract is unsatisfactory... the Club shall have the right to terminate this
contract ....
Id. at 285 n.1 (quoting paragraph six of NFL Standard Player's Contract). For a
further discussion of how other professional sports leagues' standard contracts
have similar language yet teams still guarantee contracts, see infra notes 176-78 and
accompanying text.
143. See Tillman, 265 So. 2d at 287 (finding one of Tillman's doctors based his
evaluation on misinformed facts when the doctor claimed Tillman still endured
injuries when Saints terminated contract); see also Brazener, supra note 139, at 263-
64 (summarizing Tillman's facts and holdings).
144. 621 S.W.2d 382, 386 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (upholding team's termination of
injured player's contract).
145. See Brazener, supra note 139, at 17 (Supp. 2005) (acknowledging that
court in Gambrell appropriately dismissed player's suit because team terminated
employment in accordance with contract's terms).
146. See Gambrel, 621 S.W.2d at 383-84 (summarizing facts of case).
147. See id. at 384 (describing team's release as "an option for unilateral ter-
mination available to the [team] under the contract whenever the coach deter-
mines that the player no longer has sufficient skill and capacity to perform the
required caliber of football"). For a further discussion of the contract's relevant
provision, see supra notes 176-78.
148. Brazener, supra note 139, at 265 (describing underlying principle behind
Gambrell's holding).
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indirect role. 149 Competition between leagues during the late
1950s, a result of the Supreme Court's refusal to grant the NFL an
antitrust exemption, led to competitive bidding for player services
and forced teams to offer guaranteed compensation. 150 The NFL
signing bonus first arrived in 1959 when Pete Rozelle tried to lure a
collegiate all-star running back away from the AFL and offered the
superstar a $10,000 signing bonus.151
2. NFL Signing Bonuses
"In a league in which annual salaries aren't guaranteed, and in
which one injury or one coach's decision can force a player to for-
feit millions of dollars in salary, signing bonuses are key."152 Sign-
ing bonuses stem from the CBA, which governs how players and
teams can contract and allows for bonus provisions to function as
guaranteed compensation. 153 Signing bonuses, nevertheless, allow
the NFL to continue under the false pretense that its players receive
guaranteed yearly salaries like those in other professional sports
leagues.1 54
149. For an explanation of the courts' indirect role in bringing at least some
form of guaranteed contracts to the NFL, see infta notes 150-51 and accompanying
text.
150. See Sipusic, supra note 3, at 212-13 ("[C]ompetition among teams and
between leagues for the services of talented players has made the structure of
player compensation packages an important element of professional football." (cit-
ing Vic CARucci, THE NFL CENTURY 184 (1999))). For a description of the NFL's
antitrust exemption, see supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
151. See Sipusic, supra note 3, at 213 (noting despite Rozelle's efforts, AFL's
Houston Oilers offered $100,000 guaranteed contract to all-star running back).
For a further discussion characterizing Rozelle as an important part of the NFL's
development, see supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
152. NFL Truths and Rumors: April 4, 2005, Apr. 4, 2005, http://sportsillus-
trated.cnn.com/2005/scorecard/04/04/truth.rumors.nfl/index.html (acknowl-
edging Tom Brady's contract, which does not have fully guaranteed signing bonus,
is rare in NFL). The New England Patriots, Brady's employer, diversified the
quarterback's signing bonus. See id. (explaining Brady's contract). Diversifying
permits a team to guarantee even less money. See id. (noting this provision caused
problems during contract negotiation between Patriots and Brady).
153. See NFL CBA, supra note 75, at 9 ("The provisions of this Agreement
supersede any conflicting provisions in the NFL Player Contract, the NFL Constitu-
tion and Bylaws, or any other document affecting terms and conditions of employ-
ment of NFL players .... "). The NFL's CBA later states "[a] player will be entitled
to receive a signing or reporting bonus, additional salary payments, incentive bo-
nuses and such other provisions .... " Id. at 174 (indicating player bonuses are
permissible).
154. See, e.g., SeanJensen, Spotlight NFL Contracts: Dissatisfaction Guaranteed, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 4, 2005, at C1 (observing MLB, NBA, and National
Hockey League ("NHL") normally guarantee contracts, while NFL does not). For
a further description of how MLB and the NBA guarantee most of their contracts,
see infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
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a. Signing Bonuses, the CBA, and the Courts
Signing bonuses are popular among NFL owners because the
CBA has loopholes allowing teams to use the signing bonus as a
means to stay within the salary cap. 155 Put simply, teams can pro-
rate a signing bonus over the life of a contract, meaning a $10 mil-
lion signing bonus, which a team guarantees a player up front, be-
comes only $1 million annually under the salary cap once pro-rated
over ten years. 156 Further, the CBA's expansive definition of "sign-
ing bonus" allows teams to give players bonuses for working out
during off-seasons, promptly reporting to training camp, and sim-
ply making the team. 157 Therefore, signing bonuses, at face value,
favor NFL players because they create numerous ways to guarantee
more up-front money.158 This logic, however, ignores the underly-
ing problem: signing bonuses are only attractive to players because
guaranteed multi-year salaries are essentially non-existent in the
NFL. 159
155. See Sipusic, supra note 3, at 217 (clarifying NFL CBA's salary cap provi-
sions and explaining how Dallas Cowboys' ownerJerryJones uses loopholes to his
advantage). For a definition of the NFL salary cap, see NFL CBA, supra note 75, at
95-96.
156. See NFL CBA, supra note 75, at 99 ("The total amount of any signing
bonus shall be prorated over the term of the Player Contract in determining Team
and Player Salary .. ").
157. See Sipusic, supra note 3, at 218 ("The creation of multiple signing bonus
categories (NFL teams are allowed to prorate almost any type of bonus) in effect
creates extra room under the salary cap."). The CBA defines signing bonus, in
part, as "[a]ny amount specifically described in a Player Contract as a signing bo-
nus .... ." NFL CBA, supra note 75, at 103 (describing "Amounts Treated as Signing
Bonuses"). Courts, however, have defined a signing bonus as an "independent
(i.e., extra-contractual) obligation paid for the mere act of signing a contract with
the potential employer .... It can be considered an inducement to sign, not
compensation for work performed or to be performed for the Employer." Station
v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 608 A.2d 625, 629 n.3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992)
(citing McGlasson v. Workmen's Comp. Bd., 557 A.2d 841 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989))
(holding signing bonus is entirely separate from yearly salary and weekly wages).
This definition differs from the NFL's CBA because it defines the signing bonus as
a unilateral, separate contractual agreement which only requires the physical act of
signing the contract to guarantee the bonus. See Sipusic, supra note 3, at 226, 231-
38 (characterizing NFL's definition as common law, summarizing court decisions
addressing definition of signing bonus, and discussing how NFL's CBA definition
of signing bonus creates problems).
158. SeeJensen, supra note 154 ("It is a one-way street .... But that's why you
want to go out there and get as much as you can up front." (quoting Pro-Bowler
Darren Sharper)); Sipusic, supra note 3, at 218 ("It is the threat of these events that
motivate a player and his agent to seek large signing bonus amounts as opposed to
large annual salary totals.").
159. For a further discussion asserting that the NFL does not regularly guar-
antee contracts, see supra notes 154, 158. See also Sipusic, supra note 3, at 238
(describing problems with NFL's signing bonus and arguing "[iln choosing to ig-
453
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b. T.O.'s Current Contract
Terrell Owens's current contract demonstrates how signing bo-
nuses mask the absence of guaranteed contracts. 60 T.O.'s current
deal with the Philadelphia Eagles is for seven years and is worth $49
million. 161 T.O.'s contract includes a $9.2 million signing bonus
and is worth approximately $7 million annually over the first three
years. 162 According to some NFL agents, the signing bonus and the
average yearly salary during a contract's first three years are the two
measuring sticks for veteran player contracts. 163 Analyzing T.O.'s
contract using these numbers, his salary seems comparable to the
NFL's other top wide receivers.1 64
Only focusing on these numbers, however, ignores a contrac-
tual provision and the situation surrounding T.O.'s career. 165 First,
T.O.'s base salary was $3.5 million in 2005, $770,000 in 2006 (plus a
potential $7.5 million bonus check), $5.5 million in 2007, $6.5 mil-
lion in 2008, $7.5 million in 2009, and $8.5 million in 2010.166 Sec-
ond, he will be thirty-three years old in 2006, the average age when
wide receivers hit "the wall that all great players hit at some point in
their careers, the one [that] will diminish his abilities, and along
with them his bargaining power."167 Third, the Eagles, T.O.'s em-
nore many years of common law groundwork, the NFL built the proverbial house
upon the sand").
160. For further discussion on T.O.'s contract, see infra notes 161-73 and ac-
companying text.
161. See Brookover, Rivals, supra note 10 (describing T.O.'s contract).
162. See id. (detailing T.O.'s contract).
163. See id. ("The signing bonus is No. 1 because in a world of non-guaran-
teed contracts and a brutal contact sport, the only guaranteed money is the signing
bonus." (quoting NFL agent Leigh Steinberg)).
164. See, e.g., id. (observing only two wide receivers, Randy Moss and Marvin
Harrison, had more lucrative contracts over first three years). By this measure,
T.O.'s salary is better than all other NFL wide receivers, including Jimmy Smith,
Eric Moulds, Torry Holt, Isaac Bruce, and Joe Horn. See id. (characterizing these
receivers as top veteran NFL wide receivers).
165. For further discussion on why T.O.'s contract needs a closer examination
to avoid misunderstanding its implications, see infra notes 166-73 and accompany-
ing text.
166. See Bradley, supra note 7 (noting $3.5 million is "paltry" when compared
to other wide receivers); T.O. 's Season Effectively Over After Arbitrator Sides With Eagles,
Nov. 24, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section=nfl&id=2235471
[hereinafter T.O. 's Season Effectively Over] (detailing T.O.'s base yearly salaries for
remainder of his contract).
167. Robert Bonnette, Why T.O. Is Doing What He's Doing, Aug. 3, 2005, http:/
/www.terrellowens.com/news/news.php?newsid=348 (analyzing career numbers
of NFL's best wide receivers). This source, however, originates from T.O.'s official
website, www.terrellowens.com. Nonetheless, other commentators support this
idea. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 7 (arguing T.O. has valid point "[b]ut, in typical
T.O. fashion, he has gone about this all wrong").
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ployer, rarely dole out big money for players past their prime. 168
An inflated signing bonus conceals these facts and leaves the fans
with the mistaken perception that T.O.'s griping only concerns the
total $49 million. 169 But according to NFL agent Leigh Steinberg,
"The total value of the deal is just an illusion because the numbers
are so inflated on the back end that the player will either have to
renegotiate or he'll be cut."1 70
T.O.'s contract epitomizes how the NFL takes advantage of
signing bonuses and capitalizes on teams' collective efforts to keep
guaranteed contracts out of professional football. 171 The absence
of guaranteed contracts explains why signing bonuses play such a
168. See Bonnette, supra note 167 (claiming Eagles will terminate T.O.'s con-
tract before 2006 season, when his current contract calls for sharp, annual salary
increases); Bradley, supra note 7 (maintaining T.O.'s contract should trouble him
because Eagles do not normally pay premium dollar for thirty-three year-old wide
receivers). In fact, the Eagles recently cut T.O. the day before he was due a $5
million roster bonus. See Bob Brookover, Birds Have Little to Say as They Set Owens
Free, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 15, 2006, at DI (adding that Eagles pithily announced
move with fourteen-word statement: "The Philadelphia Eagles today announced
they have terminated the contract of WR Terrell Owens."). Thus, the T.O. saga in
Philadelphia officially ends.
169. For a further discussion of T.O.'s contract, see supra and infra notes 160-
70 and accompanying text. The actual dollar amounts involved are staggering -
just T.O.'s 2005 salary, a cool $3.5 million, is significantly more money than most
people see in a lifetime. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 7 (citing U.S. census) (indi-
cating Pennsylvania's median income for family of four is $66,569 and $9 million
guarantee contract ensures player $180,000 per year for fifty years); Tu-Uyen Tran,
Grand Forks Wages Get Closer to National Average, Still Lag Fargo, Bismarck, GRAND
FoRKs HERALD, Apr. 28, 2005 (noting average U.S. worker earned approximately
$31,500 in 2003, meaning they would have to work more than 100 years to equal
T.O.'s 2005 income). While the astronomical numbers should not be trivialized,
the players should also not be faulted. See, e.g., MICHENER, supra note 3, at 373 ("If
one is able to accept the gross imbalance existing in all American salaries, there
should be no complaint against those paid to athletes."). For a further discussion
arguing T.O. should be thought of as a businessman, not just an athlete, and
briefly explaining why NFL salaries are so lucrative, see infra notes 211-16 and ac-
companying text. Professional sport is strictly a business, so players, as a critical
component of this economic model, have every right to fight for their market
value. For a further discussion of how team owners have always treated profes-
sional sports as businesses, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
170. Brookover, Rivals, supra note 10 (quoting Leigh Steinberg). Recently,
NFL teams cut many marquee players to make room under their salary caps. See,
e.g., Chris Harry, NFL Set for Free-Agent Bonanza, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 10, 2006
(noting Brian Griese, Kerry Collins, LaVar Arrington, Willie McGinest, Ty Law,
Mike Anderson, and Kevin Mawae were "veteran cap casualties").
171. See, e.g.,Jensen, supra note 154 (describing Matt Birk's contract situation
with Minnesota Vikings). Birk, a Harvard economics major and four-time Pro-
Bowler for the Minnesota Vikings, offered to play the 2005 season while seriously
injured if the team would guarantee his 2006 salary. See id. ("I didn't want to as-
sume 100 percent of the risk." (quoting Birk)). Afraid to set precedent, the Vik-
ings' owner refused. See id. (characterizing issue of guaranteed contracts as one
that "divides players, the players association and ownership").
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large role in the NFL's compensation system.' 72 In other major
professional sports leagues, however, signing bonuses have minimal
impact because teams guarantee the vast majority of players'
salaries.173
3. Comparison to Other Major Sport Leagues
Guaranteed contracts in other sports are prevalent due to pre-
cedent. 174 This demonstrates that the CBAs are surprisingly not the
determinative factor in bringing guaranteed contracts to profes-
sional athletes. 175 A comparison of the NFL and MLB CBA's illus-
trates this point.
The MLB CBA's language, for example, is similar to compara-
ble provisions of the NFL's CBA.176 The MLB CBA stipulates that
the "Club may terminate [a] contract upon written notice to the
Player.. . if the Player shall at any time... fail, in the opinion of
the Club's management, to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive
ability to qualify or continue as a member of the Club's team;
... 177 This language essentially mirrors that of the NFL's CBA;
yet MLB teams do not cut players for failing "to exhibit sufficient
172. For a further discussion demonstrating that signing bonuses allow NFL
teams to offer non-guaranteed contracts, see supra notes 152-59 and accompanying
text.
173. SeeJensen, supra note 154 (observing that "nearly every dollar is guaran-
teed" in other professional sports); see also Daniel M. Faber, The Evolution of Tech-
niques for Negotiation of Sports Employment Contracts in the Era of the Agent, 10 U. MIAMI
ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 165, 182 (1993) ("[The agents] are still trying to negotiate
guaranteed contracts, which, in our business, there are very few of, unlike baseball
and basketball." (alteration in original) (quoting NFL team official)). For a fur-
ther discussion acknowledging that MLB and NBA teams guarantee almost every
contract, see supra note 154.
174. For a discussion comparing NFL and MLB contracts, see infra notes 176-
78 and accompanying text.
175. SeeJensen, supra note 154 ("[T]he CBA in each sport does not say one
way or another that contracts are guaranteed." (quoting Richard Berthelsen,
NFLPA's general counsel)). The NBA's CBA, however, does guarantee some
money. See Howard J. Soifer & Kevin J. Roragen, No Play, No Pay: The 1998-99 NBA
Lockout, The Effect of Arbitrator Feerick's October 19, 1998, Opinion Regarding the NBA
Players Association Grievance, and the Limitations of Guaranteed Contracts, 3 T.M. Coo-
LEYJ. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 115, 120 n.22 (2000) (citing NBA Collective Bargaining
Agreement, art. II § 3(e) (i)-(iv)) (noting NBA teams cannot terminate player for
"lack of skill").
176. Compare MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. IX § E, at 28, http:/
/mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cbaenglish.pdf [hereinafter MLB CBA] (explain-
ing how team can cut injured player), with NFL CBA, supra note 75, at 232 (indicat-
ing team does not have to honor contract after season of injury).
177. MLB CBA, supra note 176, at 212 (defining terms of Major League Uni-
form Player's Contract).
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skill or competitive ability" because MLB franchises guarantee
contracts.
178
NFL offensive lineman Matt Birk compared the NBA to the
NFL:
It'sjust ironic. Football is the most popular sport. The TV
deal is worth unprecedented money. There's worldwide
appeal. And you're going to tell me guaranteed contracts
can't work for us, but they'll work for basketball, where
more people watch CSI [a popular CBS television show]
than the seventh game of the NBA Finals? Give me a
break.'
7 9
Birk, like T.O., has a valid point. NFL players generate more
money than their professional counterparts, yet receive the most
ephemeral contracts.1 8 0 Despite the soundness of their arguments,
limiting factors depress NFL player salaries regardless of the
league's popularity and abundant cash flow.1 8 '
C. Some Limiting Factors
NFL players make their pleas for guaranteed contracts in the
face of a daunting fact: football is a brutal sport with a high injury
risk. 182 Owners and team officials, therefore, argue the nature of
football demands the current compensation system because teams
178. See NFL CBA, supra note 75, at 233 (establishing team may terminate
contract if "[p]layer's skill or performance has been unsatisfactory as compared
with that of other players competing for positions on Club's roster . . ."). Some
argue, therefore, a weak NFLPA is unrelated to the lack of guaranteed contracts in
the NFL since CBAs do not address this issue in other leagues. SeeJensen, supra
note 154 ("The common misunderstanding out there ... is that the NFL doesn't
have guaranteed contracts, so basketball and baseball unions do a better job." (el-
lipsis in original) (quoting NFLPA's general counsel)). This conclusion misleads
for two reasons: it ignores 1) that the NBA CBA does have some guaranteed money
and 2) that MLB and NBA players never needed to fight for guaranteed contracts
because owners succumbed years ago. For a further discussion detailing the rele-
vant provisions of NBA's CBA, see supra note 175. For a further discussion explain-
ing that guaranteed contracts are the norm in the NBA and MLB, see supra note
154 and infra note 179.
179. Jensen, supra note 154 (quoting Birk and stating NFLPA should demand
guaranteed contracts during renegotiation of current CBA). For a further discus-
sion of Birk's struggle for a guaranteed contract, see supra note 171.
180. For a further discussion of the NFL's financial successes, see supra note 3
and accompanying text. For a further discussion comparing NFL contracts with
MLB and NBA contracts, see supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
181. For a further discussion of these limiting factors, see infra notes 182-206
and accompanying text.
182. SeeJerry Sullivan, Though Spikes is Gone, His Desire Can't be Forgotten, BUF-
FALO NEWS, Oct. 2, 2005, at C4 ("Pro football is a brutal, unsentimental sport.").
For a further discussion noting the average NFL player's career lasts less than three
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would otherwise be unable to freely adjust their rosters and sport
competitively balanced on-field products. 183 Owners are only par-
tially correct: the nature of football will inevitably curtail players'
salaries. 184 Guaranteed contracts, however, will probably not hurt
the competitively balanced product the NFL currently produces. 185
1. Nature of Football
Football is frighteningly violent; a hard tackle can generate
more force than a serious car accident.1 86 Football's violent nature
translates into short careers for NFL players, with an average career
lasting three seasons. 187 This helps explain why NFL player con-
tracts will never be as lucrative as those in the MLB or NBA, where
the injury risks are relatively minimal.188
Additional factors will continue to suppress NFL players' sala-
ries: 1) NFL teams play only eight home games per season, while
MLB plays eighty-one and the NBA forty-one;189 2) NFL football
seasons, see supra note 50. For a further discussion of football's violent nature, see
infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
183. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 42, at 125 (indicating Rozelle believed
greater contract freedom would diminish on-field equality, fan interest, and team
revenue); Truelock, supra note 84, at 1948 (citing Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606,
611 (8th Cir. 1976)) (noting since Mackey, NFL argues competitive balance is es-
sential for "a successful entertainment product"); Jensen, supra note 154 (noting
Philadelphia Eagles PresidentJoe Banner insists "[t]eams could be decimated for
several years if a high-paid player were to suffer a season- or career-ending injury").
Further, Minnesota Vikings' Vice President of Football Operations argues: "I don't
know [with guaranteed contracts] that we'd have the competitive balance, which is
what makes the NFL so unique right now." Jensen, supra note 154 (quoting Rob
Brzezinski).
184. For a further discussion acknowledging that the injury rate, high num-
ber of players, and low number of home games necessarily curtail NFL player sala-
ries, see infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
185. For further discussion on the competitive balance issue, see infra notes
200-06 and accompanying text.
186. SeeJosh Kendall, Study Measures Strength of Hits: Study to Use Airbag Technol-
ogy to Study Hard Hits, COLUMBUS LEDGER-INQUIRER (Ga.), Oct. 2, 2005 (describing
how hardest tackles during college football team's practice created more force
than serious car accident); see also Heidi M. Hurd, Was the Frog Prince Sexually Mo-
lested?: A Review of Peter Westen's The Logic of Consent, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1329, 1329
(2005) ("[W]e do not know what we think we know about a capacity that on a daily
basis turns .. .brutal batteries into football games ....").
187. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 154 (quoting NFL wide receiver). For a fur-
ther discussion noting the average NFL player's career lasts three seasons, see supra
note 50.
188. SeeJensen, supra note 154 ("You wouldn't see the gaudy 10-year, $102
million contracts [in the NFL]. In basketball, it's a 10-year, $102 million contract.
But in football, it's a year-to-year thing." (quoting NFL linebacker)).
189. See NFL CBA, supra note 75, at 175 (setting limit for regular season
games); MLB CBA, supra note 176, at 3 (determining 162-game regular season);
National Basketball Players Association Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. XX,
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teams have forty-five-men active rosters, compared to MLB's twenty-
five and NBA's twelve; 190 and 3) NFL players must wear heavy pad-
ding and helmets, which significantly decreases their recognizability
amongst fans and, consequently, lessens their celebrity-like demand
that drives up salaries in the NBA and MLB. 191 Nevertheless, these
factors are not the root of the problem. 192 The high injury rate is
the ultimate source of non-guaranteed contracts in the NFL be-
cause one costly injury to a top-pay player, owners argue, could ruin
a team for years. 193
2. Counterarguments
For example, if Indianapolis Colts quarterback Peyton Man-
ning suffered a career-ending injury in 2005, then Manning's con-
tract alone would account for twenty-five percent of his team's
salary in 2006 due to an acceleration clause. 194 This example, how-
ever, does not consider that quarterbacks, typically the highest paid
players, have notably longer average careers than other NFL play-
§1, at 186, http://www.nbpa.org/downloads/CBA.pdf [hereinafter NBA CBA]
(limiting regular season to 82 games).
190. See NFL CBA, supra note 75, at 163 (defining permissible active "squad
size" limit); MLB CBA, supra note 176, at 49 (limiting active roster to twenty-five
players); NBA CBA, supra note 189, at 206 (limiting active roster to twelve players).
191. See, e.g., MACKEY & LovERRo, supra note 13, at 180 ("[O]n game day, the
fans would ask, 'Hey, who is that?' And I still remember the vendors calling, 'You
can't tell the players without a program."' (quoting 1987 speech Mackey gave at
players' conference)); William B. Gould IV, Labor Issues in Professional Sports: Reflect-
ing on Baseball, Labor, and Antitrust Law, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 61, 79 (2004)
(arguing public identifies professional baseball players as individuals more so than
professional football players); Tim Tucker, Vick's Playoff Mark[et]: QB Faces Ad
Windfall From Any Postseason Success, ATLANTAJ. CoNsT.,Jan. 12, 2005, at D1 ("Gen-
erally, football is not as conducive to lucrative ad deals for individual players as
other sports, like basketball and golf, because its players are less visible, wearing
helmets and sharing the field with 21 others."); see also SZVMANSKI & ZIMBALIST,
supra note 3, at 147 (comparing movie stars Cameron Diaz's and Tom Cruise's
celebrity status to baseball player Alex Rodriguez's).
192. For an example of teams' serious concerns with the injury problem, see
infra note 197.
193. For a further discussion of how injuries could decimate an NFL team's
salary cap, see infra note 194 and accompanying text.
194. SeeJensen, supra note 154 (characterizing argument of Philadelphia Ea-
gles PresidentJoe Banner). Peyton Manning still has $23,000,000 remaining from
his record $34,500,000 signing bonus. See id. (explaining Manning's contract).
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ers. 1 95 Additionally, huge signing bonuses would not exist in an
NFL with guaranteed contracts. 196
Owners and some veteran players alternatively argue against
guaranteed contracts by asserting the system currently rewards play-
ers who make a difference. 197 Some veteran players argue guaran-
teed contracts would only bring "dead money" to teams' salary caps,
meaning that teams would opt for younger players because of their
relative durability and inexpensiveness. 198 Nevertheless, this argu-
ment ignores the critical fact that despite the lucrative salaries, own-
ers cannot forsake workers' rights by forcing players to tolerate
unthinkable pain. 199
3. Competitive Balance?
The owners additionally insist that guaranteed contracts would
ruin the NFL's inter-team equality. 20 0 The competitive balance
question, however, is complicated because there is no agreed upon
definition and its financial impact on sports leagues is debatable. 20 1
195. Compare Ray Buck, Pass/Fail: Most NFL Quarterbacks Are No Longer Ready
for Prime Time, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 11, 2005, at C13 (noting years 5-
10 of NFL quarterback's career are typically his most productive), with Jensen,
supra note 154 (acknowledging average professional football player career lasts
three seasons); see also BERRY ET AL., supra note 42, at 134 (indicating teams pay
quarterbacks more than any other position).
196. For a further discussion of how NFL owners use signing bonuses in lieu
of multi-year guaranteed contracts, see supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 154 ("Right now, the system is set up so every-
one works hard and is motivated to perform. If money went to players who were
not playing or injured, that means much less money for the other players who are
making a difference." (quoting Eagles Team President)). Similarly, NBA coach
and ex-player Byron Scott suggests "[b]asketball should be just like the NFL, with
no guaranteed contracts. In the NFL, you see guys with broken arms trying to get
in there because they know they can get cut tomorrow." Id. (indicating sentiments
against guaranteed contracts exist outside NFL).
198. See id. (noting NFL linebacker argues veterans would suffer because
"dead money" under salary cap would force teams to seek younger, cheaper
players).
199. See id. ("It seems like the public and ownership thinks that because these
guys get paid so much that they should have to tolerate more pain .... Just be-
cause they're getting paid a lot doesn't mean they should throw out the rules as it
relates to workers' rights." (quoting NFL agent Joe Linta)).
200. For a further discussion of the role competitive balance plays in NFL
contracting, see infra note 201 and accompanying text. But see Stefan Szymanski,
Obstacles to Level Playing Field, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, http://search.ft.
com/search/article.html (arguing NFL's financial equality does not create equal
balance on playing field).
201. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 42, at 103-04 (noting district court's ruling in
Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), modifled, 593 F.2d 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1978), where court concludes owners presented "equivocal" evidence to
support their claim that free agency would destroy competitive balance); SzvsAN-
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Regardless, the NFL clings to the notion that its popularity stems
from the league's level playing field.20 2 That is arguable, but guar-
anteed contracts and greater labor freedom will probably not de-
stroy the NFL's competitive balance because 1) all teams in the
long run will suffer equally from injuries and 2) lessons from MLB
suggest otherwise.20 3
Even if guaranteed contracts create a shift toward greater im-
balance, this will unlikely affect the NFL's popularity when consid-
ering soccer's experience - unmatched worldwide appeal trumping
severe on-field inequality due to the sport's inherent characteris-
tics. 20 4 Likewise, America's love affair with the NFL stems from
football's intrinsic qualities: "Pro football. The game for the ear
and the eye. A 21/2 hour carnival of color, sound, and action."
20 5
Further, though operating differently from U.S. pro sports leagues,
European and international professional soccer leagues help ex-
plain the underlying argument - the NFL is strictly a business and
its product is football. 20 6
IV. CONCLUSION
Contrasting the NFL Commissioner's office with the Football
Association ("FA"), England's governing body for its soccer leagues,
paints an important picture. Since the FA's inception in 1863, its
SKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 172-74 (explaining why competitive balance in
sports is difficult to define and why its impact is questionable).
202. For a further discussion acknowledging the NFL's contention that com-
petitive balance is a critical part of the league's success, see supra note 201.
203. See SzVMANsKi & ZIMBALISr, supra note 3, at 177 (illustrating competitive
balance in MLB did not deteriorate after free agency began in 1976).
204. See id. at 191-92 (noting soccer, despite its history of competitive imbal-
ance, is world's dominant sport because of fans' national and local allegiances and
diversified levels of competition).
205. DirecTV Television Commercial (ESPN television broadcast Oct. 2, 2005)
(promoting "NFL Sunday Ticket" and adding that "[f] or the player, victory makes
the game glorious. For the fan the glory is the game"); see also MACCAMBRIDGE,
supra note 3, at 100 (describing how baseball "was never quite the ordeal that foot-
ball - with the frequent exhortations, concerted clapping, chants, and stomping,
attempting to sway both sides - had become"); Leigh Montville, The Age of Audacity,
in THE BEST OF SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 48, 49 (Sports Illustrated 1996) (purporting
football's popularity stems from its high-speed action and propensity for violence).
206. See, e.g., FRANKLIN FOER, How SOCCER EXPLAINS THE WORLD 116 (Harper
Perennial 2005) ("Americans call their sporting teams 'franchises.' Brazilians
would never tolerate that use of the term. It has too many commercial associations
with chains of McDonald's and dry cleaners. Instead, Brazilians call their teams
'clubs,' because .. . [t]hey have swimming pools, restaurants, tennis courts, palm-
covered gardens, and dues-paying members .... "). For a further discussion of
how NFL owners treat the league as a business, see supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
37
Levine: Despite is Antics, T.O. Has a Valid Point: Why NFL Players Deser
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
462 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JouRNAL
purpose has been two-fold: maintain a common set of rules and
promote the game of soccer.20 7 The NFL, on the other hand, func-
tions exclusively as a business entity and does not consider the wel-
fare of football unless it serves the dual function of increasing
profits. 20 8 The FA, a separate entity from the leagues it regulates,
seeks to spread soccer to the masses; the NFL uses football prima-
rily as a means to financially profit team owners. 20 9
Understanding this distinction changes one's perception of
professional sports in America: the NFL is a product created by
those who have financial stakes in the league's success (i.e., team
owners). 210 Therefore, players, like team presidents, general man-
agers, coaches, public relation directors, and water-boys, are the
NFL's employees. Consequently, players should not feel guilty or
be chastised for pursuing their market values, which are under-
standably very high.2 11 The top twenty NFL wide receivers, for ex-
ample, are the world's best and employed by the richest, most
popular sports league in the world's richest country.212
207. See SzYMANs~i & ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 34-47 (noting one commenta-
tor in 1899 argued "the Football Association had turned from its original object of
promoting sport and had adopted the care of the business of [soccer]").
208. For a further discussion of how NFL owners always treated football as
business, see supra note 3 and accompanying text. A comparison of William Mc-
Gregor, an early architect of England's professional soccer league, and William
Hulbert, an early influential baseball team owner, symbolizes the differences be-
tween European and American professional sport leagues:
Hulbert had risen to be a man of significant financial and political stand-
ing, while McGregor remained to the end of his life a small shopkeeper.
Hulbert was a business leader first and baseball promoter second. Mc-
Gregor was first and foremost a soccer lover .... Hulbert was a leader
who demanded control and, in the case of his club, a significant owner-
ship stake. McGregor went out of his way to state that he had no interest
in challenging the supremacy of the FA and always argued that the Foot-
ball League [England's professional soccer league] should be
subordinate.
SzyvArsKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 44 (explaining differences between origins
of professional soccer in Europe and professional baseball in U.S.). For a further
discussion of Hulbert's influence, see supra notes 30, 32.
209. See SzYMANsmi & ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 47 (arguing coexistence of FA
and England's professional soccer league symbolized compromise enabling soccer
to spread across globe).
210. For a further discussion characterizing professional sports leagues as
businesses, see supra note 3.
211. For a further discussion justifying the high price-tag for NFL talent, see
infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
212. For a further discussion characterizing the NFL as America's most popu-
lar and wealthiest sports league, see supra notes 4 and 18 and accompanying texts.
Consider, for example, if every lawyer wanted to work at the same law firm - the
relatively low supply of jobs and incredibly high demand for them would lead to
astronomical salaries. See generally HENRY HAzLIrr, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON:
THE SHORTEST AND SUREST WAY TO UNDERSTAND BASIC ECONOMICS (Three Rivers
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So T.O., with a $9 million signing bonus and $3.5 million 2005
salary, may make our stomachs turn when he complains about the
lack of guaranteed contracts. 213 But NFL owners' refusal to grant
more guaranteed compensation is equally reprehensible consider-
ing the league's ground-breaking financial success. 214 Fans and the
media criticized T.O. over the past several months, but his tumultu-
ous tenure in San Francisco, attempts to land in Philadelphia, and
embarrassing media campaign for a new contract justify the criti-
cism. 21 5 Yet beneath the ballyhoo and Rosenhaus-esque media blitz
lies a valid argument: NFL players should receive more guaranteed
contracts, their means to a bigger piece of the All-American-style
pie which the NFL gratuitously feeds to us all. 216
Press 1979) (explaining concept of supply and demand). The NFL's demand con-
tinues to sky-rocket while its supply remains steady. For further discussion on the
NFL's popularity, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
213. For a further discussion characterizing T.O.'s recent complaints and re-
actions thereto, see supra note 7 and infra note 215 and accompanying texts.
214. See Rodney Fort, Market Power in Pro Sports: Problems and Solutions, in THE
ECONOMICS OF SPORTS 7, 9 (2000) ("Some fans might begrudge players their huge
salaries, but the money that fans spend on sports will not go away. If players don't
get the money, then owners will keep it. In no small way, salaries are large because
leagues earn more than the normal rate of return."); ZIRIN, supra note 35, at 107
(arguing professional athletes should fight for every dollar because, otherwise,
owners simply keep money for themselves). For a further discussion of the NFL's
new television contracts and team revenues, see supra note 4. T.O. is both a busi-
nessman and an athlete, evidenced by his antics in both arenas. For a further
discussion depicting T.O.'s actions as brash and unreasonable, see supra notes 7-8
and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the neutral arbitrator's conclu-
sion that T.O.'s actions over the last several months were intolerable, see infra note
215.
215. See Bradley, supra note 7 (asserting T.O.'s public pleas and media stunts
prove his selfishness and problematic character). For a further discussion of
T.O.'s and Rosenhaus's antics, see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. On
Novemeber 5, 2005, the Eagles suspended T.O. for four games and deactivated
him for the rest of the 2005 season. See T.O. 's Season Effectively Over, supra note 166
(adding that Eagles' suspension came after T.O. again insulted quarterback Mc-
Nabb, called his employer "classless," and fought with former teammate). After
T.O. filed a formal grievance with the League, arbitrator Richard Bloch sided with
the Eagles "due to the nature of [T.O.'s] conduct and its destructive and continu-
ing threat to the team." Id. (concluding Eagles' action did not violate labor agree-
ment). But see Senator Says Eagles Unfair in Punishment of Owens, Nov. 29, 2005,
http://www.sportsline.com/nfl/story/9068353 (noting Pennsylvania Senator Ar-
len Specter felt Eagles' actions possibly violated antitrust laws because team acted
vindictively by forcing T.O. to miss rest of season). Senator Specter added, how-
ever, "I think he's in flagrant breach of his contract and I believe the Eagles would
be within their rights in not paying him another dime ..... Id. (emphasizing
Specter did not support T.O.'s antics).
216. See Fort, supra note 214, at 11 (indicating owners have rights to "1) gate,
stadium, and local TV revenues; 2) any revenues that can be extracted from play-
ers; 3) special tax treatment; 4) a share of league-wide, national TV contract reve-
nues; 5) a share of league earnings from expansion fees; and 6) spill-over benefits
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This will not ruin sports, as purists emphatically contend.217
Sports will remain a genuinely important part of the fabric of our
society - why sports consume so many of us during childhood, this
will remain untouched. 18 The product, however, at the profes-
sional level will continue its consistent evolution as labor relations
shift, antitrust laws change, and players develop new skills.219 Re-
gardless of these changes and/or guaranteed contracts, the NFL,
flirting with those capitalistically-contrasting ideas of community
and competition, will remain a profitable business because Ameri-
cans naturally and heavily consume its product, football. 220
POSTSCRIPT
Terry O'Neill, a "die-hard" Pittsburgh Steelers fan, suffered a
heart-attack during his team's 2006 divisional playoff game after
watching SteelerJerome Bettis fumble with one minute left in regu-
lation while the Steelers led.22 1 Apparently, America's love affair
with football is heart-attack-serious.
Matthew Levine
to other business enterprises of the team owner"). For a further discussion of the
NFL's financial success, see supra note 4.
217. For a further discussion asserting purists have inappropriately criticized
professional athletes over the last twenty years, see supra notes 2-4 and accompany-
ing text.
218. See, e.g., Montville, supra note 205, at 48 (describing how sport captures
children's imaginations).
219. For further discussion on how labor relations evolved in the NFL, see
supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. For a further discussion demonstrating
how antitrust laws shape the NFL, see supra notes 24-27 and 81-133 and accompa-
nying texts.
220. See MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 458 ("Pro football has become the
perfect symbol for the country's bustling, modernistic urgency, a splendid en-
tertainment, a taxing and transforming profession, and a meaningful metaphor
for the most American pursuit of all, those seemingly mismatched but inextricably
bound ideas of competition and community."); see also BERRY ET AL., supra note 42,
at 132 (describing NFL's revenue sharing as "a kind of corporate socialism created
by the NFL's economic cartel"). Additionally, no NFL franchise has failed during
the last fifty years. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 42, at 91 (indicating Dallas Texans
failed in 1952). Further, the NFL's popularity stretched beyond America's borders
on October 2, 2005 when the NFL's first regular season game was played on for-
eign soil in Mexico City. See Daniel Kaplan, Important Days for NFL's Global Efforts,
STREET & SMrrH'S SPORTS Bus. J., Sept. 26 - Oct. 2, 2005, at 3 (noting other inter-
national cities may want to host NFL regular season game); see also Terry Lefton,
Sponsors Eager to Spend for NFL 's Mexico Trip, STREET & SMiTH's SPORTS Bus. J., Sept.
26 - Oct. 2, 2005, at 3 (acknowledging NFL game in Mexico City generated many
interested corporate sponsors).
221. See Sean Gregory, 10 Questions for Jerome Bettis, TIME, Feb. 6, 2006, at 8
(interviewing Bettis and recounting his conversation with O'Neill after episode).
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